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I  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY  
 
The main purpose of this Staff Working Paper (SWP) is to provide economic analysis, 
statistics and background material in support of the trade policy communication "Trade, 
Growth and World Affairs". 
 
Secondly, the SWP also responds to the Competitiveness Council Conclusions1 (2009) that 
call for "an assessment of the EU’s own openness as well as that of third countries in order to 
ensure that EU businesses are operating in a genuinely global competitive environment".  This 
paper provides various indicators on the EU's and its trading partners' openness with respect 
to trade in goods, services and investment. 
 
Finally, the SWP responds to a frequently mentioned request in the public consultation on the 
new trade policy for more economic analysis on trade issues and EU trade openness.  This 
paper summarizes the findings from many feasibility studies and impact assessments on trade 
policy issues carried out internally by Commission services or subcontracted to external 
researchers.  It also refers to relevant publications by academic researchers and international 
organisations. 
 
The SWP starts by making the case again for open trade as an important driver for economic 
growth and job creation in the EU as well as worldwide, and as a necessary condition to 
strengthen the competitiveness of the EU in global markets. The triple benefits from trade 
opening are: 
 
• Economic growth: Completing all ongoing free trade negotiations (DDA and bilateral 
agreements) would add more than 0.5% to EU GDP, and making further progress on 
services and regulatory issues with major trading partners could push this figure above 1% 
of EU GDP. 
• Consumer benefits: trade brings a wider variety of goods and services to consumers and to 
companies, at lower prices.  Consumer benefits alone are estimated at 600 Euros per year. 
• Employment: 7.2% of EU employment dependents directly or indirectly on exports.  
When all trade effects are taken into account (exports, imports, productivity and efficiency 
gains, income effects, etc), around 18% of EU labour force (36 million jobs) is dependent 
on our trade performance. Trade also generates a wage premium estimated at 7%.  
 
It demonstrates that, overall, trade opening creates jobs.  Labour market pressures, especially 
in manufacturing, are mostly induced by technological progress, less so by trade opening, 
though labour market flanking measures are desirable to ensure an inclusive growth process.  
It examines the impact of the 2008-2009 economic crisis on trade flows and global 
imbalances and concludes that protectionism has so far been kept at bay. Creating more 
growth and jobs in the EU will require a stronger export orientation but without falling into 
mercantilism: competitive exports require competitive imports. 
 
The SWP then examines the trade policy instruments that could be used to accelerate 
economic growth and job creation. The EU is among the most open economies in the world in 
terms of import tariffs but still faces high tariffs on its exports to some countries and regions. 
The bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations launched under the Global Europe 
                                                 
1 Council Conclusions " Priorities for the Internal Market in the next decade ─ a contribution by the 
Competitiveness Council to the post-2010 Lisbon agenda", 4 December 2009, paragraph 19. 
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trade strategy (2006) will eliminate tariffs on substantially all trade in goods with these FTA 
partners that account for about half of EU external trade. The remaining tariffs will be mainly 
on trade in agricultural products, except for imports from the least developed countries and 
developing countries having signed an Economic Partnership Agreement, and on the 
remaining half of EU trade with its largest trading partners (US, Japan, China, Russia) where 
MFN tariffs will continue to apply. 
 
The paper shows that the trade costs of non-tariff barriers to trade are now relatively more 
important than tariffs, especially in trade between the EU and its major trading partners.  This 
includes trade costs created by differences in regulatory measures, norms and technical 
standards. Likewise, the trade costs of regulatory barriers to services trade are considerably 
higher than tariffs on goods. Initiatives to deepen the completion of the EU Single Market in 
services should facilitate EU external negotiations on services trade opening.  More will need 
to be done to ensure that domestic reforms in the EU benefit growth through a two-way 
interaction between EU Single Market reforms and external market access policies.  
 
Evidence is presented that shows that EU public procurement markets are considerably more 
open than those of major trading partners.  While this gives EU taxpayers more value for their 
tax money, it also reduces EU leverage in trade negotiations on access for EU exporters to 
public procurement markets in other countries. 
 
Trade openness is an important lever to lift developing countries out of poverty and enable 
them to reap the benefits of globalisation. The EU's General System of Preferences (GSP) for 
exports from developing countries has contributed to this.  Furthermore, the EU provides 
considerable Aid-for-Trade to help them build the capacity to benefit more. Fast-growing 
Emerging Market Economies have different development needs and capacities, compared to 
low-income countries.  This needs to be reflected in future unilateral EU trade preferences for 
developing countries.  
 
It is difficult to make general statements about the impact of trade opening on the 
environment, including on greenhouse gas emissions, natural resources and biodiversity.  For 
example, there is a perception that long-distance trade necessarily increases the carbon 
footprint of goods, because of the emissions involved in transport. This is by no means a 
forgone conclusion because several factors play positive and negative roles.  In the context of 
the EU2020 emphasis on sustainable and inclusive growth , more attention will need to be 
paid to assessing the social and environmental impact of trade agreements, including on 
greenhouse gas emissions, and measures that can be taken to mitigate potential negative 
impacts. 
 
Trade is one of the main channels of global innovation and knowledge transmission.  The EU 
has a strong global market position in knowledge and innovation-intensive goods. A variety 
of trade policy instruments has been put in place to promote trade in innovative goods and 
protect the underlying intellectual property rights that enable these goods to fetch premium 
prices on global markets.  More still needs to be done however to combat trade in 
counterfeited goods. 
 
In summary, this SWP demonstrates the potential contribution that EU trade policy can make 
to the achievement of the EU2020 policy objectives of smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth and job creation.  The multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations currently underway 
will boost trade mainly by means of further tariff reduction on goods, and to a lesser extent by 
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means of reductions in non-tariff barriers. Attention now needs to be directed to reducing the 
trade costs of non-tariff barriers and regulatory measures in goods, services and investment, 
achieving better market access in public procurement and raw materials, and protecting IPR.   
 
II THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TRADE OPENING 
 
This chapter makes the case for further trade opening and the role that trade can play in 
coming out of an economic crisis. It provides evidence to support the view that trade openness 
contributes to the objectives of Europe 2020 in terms of enhancing economic growth and 
creating more jobs. The changes in the sector and skill composition of the EU labour force, 
which can mostly be put down to  rapid technological progress, and to a lesser extent to trade 
opening, require flanking measures to ease the transition for workers. It is also argued that the 
opening up of external trade and internal (domestic) reform measures cannot be separated, 
either for developing countries or for the EU. Internal Market reforms and external 
competitiveness are inextricably linked. The Single Market is not an isolated island but a two-
way street that links the EU with the global economy. 
 
 
1) TRADE AND GROWTH: THE TRIPLE BENEFIT FROM TRADE OPENING 
 
Global trade has grown rapidly in the last decade. From 1999 to 2009 the value of world 
merchandise trade grew by 73%.2 That growth occurred largely independently of trade 
policies and reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers3. It is driven mainly by growth in 
incomes and demand, especially in emerging market economies, and by falling transport and 
communication costs, improvements in economic policies and the investment climate in 
emerging market economies, and the relentless competitive pressures that drive the search for 
innovation, cost-cutting, outsourcing and economies of scale in many industries.  
 
The rapid economic rise and increasing involvement in global trade of the emerging market 
economies, especially the major players such as China, Russia, India and Brazil, is sometimes 
perceived as a threat to the economic position of the EU.  However, the empirical evidence 
points out that the EU has done well over the past decade in terms of its trade performance in 
the global economy; it has turned challenges into opportunities. The EU's share of global 
goods exports has been more or less stable, despite a strong increase in the share of emerging 
market economies and a significant decline of the share of other major developed economies, 
including the US and Japan (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Source: WTO and Eurostat. This excludes intra EU27 trade, values in euro. 
3 The importance of trade opening in the growth of world trade is subject to different interpretations.  Bergstrand 
(2001) estimates that about a quarter of the growth in world trade can be attributed to tariff reductions. The 
trade impact of non-tariff barrier reduction is estimated to be even greater.  See "The Growth of World Trade: 
Tariffs, Transport Costs, and Income Similarity," (with Scott L. Baier), Journal of International 
Economics/Elsevier, 53, February, 2001, 1-27. But Yi (2001), for instance, argues that vertical specialisation 
and growth in trade in intermediate goods is the main driver as opposed to trade policy.  See Kei-Mu Yi, 2001. 
"Can vertical specialization explain the growth of world trade?," Staff Reports 96, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York.  
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Figure 1  Share of EU27*, USA, Japan and China in World Trade in Goods (%) 
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Moreover, the EU has done relatively well over the period 1994-2007 in high-tech products 
and in all price segments of the market4, as shown in Table 1.  The two major developed 
countries, US and Japan, lost very significant market shares in high tech products while the 
EU managed a small increase.  Only China significantly increased market share in high tech 
products, although starting from a very low share5.  The EU also held ground in the upper 
price segment of goods markets where other major developed countries lost significantly. 
 
Trade opening has given a significant boost to global trade flows. However, trade growth is 
not pursued for its own sake. Trade is a means for the EU to reap a triple benefit: (i) more 
economic growth; (ii) greater consumer welfare and higher incomes and (iii) increased 
employment and better-paid jobs. How much growth in trade has contributed to incomes and 
employment creation is not an easy question to answer. In fact, this question has stimulated 
considerable debate in economic circles. 
 
The debate mainly revolves around different measures of trade openness.  Should openness be 
measured on the basis of trade instruments such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, or 
should it be measured in terms of results, for instance the ratio of trade to GDP? All of these 
measures have pros and cons. A simple average tariff gives equal weight to all tariffs, but 
                                                 
4 A. Cheptea, L. Fontagné and S. Zignago (2010) "European export performance", CEPII working document nr 
2010-12, available at www.cepii.fr.  Table 1 is taken from the same study.  High-tech products are defined as 
products based mainly on high-tech content. Goods are classified in upper, middle and lower market price 
segments with respect to the global price distribution of trade flows.  See paper for more detailed explanations.  
See also section IV.4. 
5 The figure for China should be interpreted with caution since a large part of its high-tech exports is actually 
processing exports whereby only a small part of the total value-added is produced in China. 
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does not take into consideration the importance of different tariff lines for trade. A trade-
weighted average tariff underestimates trade barriers and hides the importance of very high 
tariffs that cut off trade completely, since their weight in the overall average would be zero. 
The overall ratio of trade to GDP (see table 2) is influenced by country size (smaller 
economies generally trade more with the rest of the world than do the larger economies, 
which have a large internal market), location and industry structure. Most researchers use a 
combination of all these measures, so as to iron out biases in each of them6. There is no single 
perfect measure and, moreover, these measures do not correlate well with each other. Taking 
them one step further and trying to establish a causal link between trade openness measures 
and economic growth makes matters even more difficult. 
 
Table 1  World market shares for high-tech products and by market price segment. 
EU25 and major trading partners (1994-2007) 
 
 High-tech products Up-market Mid-market Low-market 
 2007 94-07 2007 94-07 2007 94-07 2007 94-07 
Exporter % share change % share change % share change % share change 
EU25 16.9 0.81 28.8 0.83 16.8 -1.51 16.1 0.25 
EU15 15.7 -0.02 27.5 -0.16 15.6 -2.18 14.6 -0.24 
NMS10 1.2 0.83 1.3 0.99 1.2 0.68 1.5 0.49 
USA 13.7 -11.15 13.5 -6 13.5 -3.2 10.5 -5.39 
Japan 8.0 -12.68 9.8 -9.76 8 -10.79 8.5 -1.34 
China 21.2 17.79 7.6 5.94 15.5 11.37 22.9 10.67 
India 0.6 0.39 1.0 0.52 1.9 1.0 1.9 0.5 
Russia 0.4 0.14 0.9 0.59 2.0 0.9 1.5 0.22 
Brazil 0.6 0.32 0.9 0.12 2.1 -0.2 1.7 -0.19 
Source: CEPII (2010) "European export performance".  See footnote 5. 
Note: Change in market shares in percentage points.   
 
 
Table 2  Trade ratios as a measure of openness for the EU and major partners 
Trade / GDP ratios 
World 0,41 
EU27 0,26 
    
USA 0,24 
Japan 0,27 
China 0,50 
Russia 0,44 
Brazil 0,23 
India 0,46 
Source: IMF, WTO, Eurostat data 
 
Conceptually, there are several arguments for a positive link between trade and economic 
growth. First, openness enhances efficient resource allocation. It creates incentives for capital 
and labour to be put to work in the areas with the highest return. Second, trade facilitates the 
                                                 
6 See for instance World Bank, "World trade indicators" (2009). 
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dissemination of knowledge and innovations embodied in goods, services and investments. 
Third, open trade encourages competition and thereby provides an incentive to supply the best 
price/quality ratio of goods to consumers and to increase productivity. Fourth, opening up 
trade gives producers access to larger markets and hence, the possibility to reap the benefits of 
increasing returns to scale and specialisation. 
 
Empirical research demonstrates that the most plausible conclusion is that trade opening does 
increase growth both in developed and in developing countries7. However, some disagree8 
and argue that institutional quality determines growth far more than trade does. In reality, 
these two effects may well be interlinked. Few would contest the importance of good 
institutions and a good regulatory environment as pre-requisites for trade-led growth and for 
attracting FDI. A consensus seems to have been emerging in recent years that trade opening 
works best for growth, employment and incomes when it is combined with other structural 
reform measures9. This is especially the case for low-income developing countries with 
lower-quality institutions. For this reason, the Commission has supported the idea of a 
development-driven approach to the Economic Partnership Agreements with the ACP 
countries that goes beyond pure trade opening to include an institutional development 
dimension. However, even for high-income countries the link between trade opening and 
institutional reforms can be important. That is why this Staff Working Paper argues in favour 
of strengthening and further reform of the EU internal market in order to reap the benefits 
from trade opening. 
 
The European Commission carries out feasibility studies and (sustainability) impact 
assessments to estimate the potential trade and economic growth effects of bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements by means of ex-ante economic simulations. The general 
equilibrium models used for this purpose capture the benefits from resource re-allocation and 
economies of scale. The effects of innovation and technological progress are more difficult to 
estimate and can usually be captured only indirectly through increased investments. Only the 
more sophisticated models capture the benefits of increased diversity in the supply of goods.  
The impact of individual bilateral FTAs on EU GDP is usually quite small, in the range of a 
0.1 to 0.2% increase, because the EU economy is much larger than the economies of its 
bilateral FTA negotiating partners. The corresponding increase in EU exports may be 
significantly higher, as much as 2%. These results suggest that there is a fairly robust case to 
be made for the positive growth effects of trade opening. For instance, if all ongoing trade 
negotiations (both multilateral and bilateral) in which the EU is engaged were to be 
successfully concluded, EU GDP would increase by around 0.5%. Making further progress in 
our relations with strategic partners, in particular an enhanced transatlantic partnership with 
the US to tackle non-tariff issues, could double this growth effect.  Furthermore, preliminary 
ex-post assessments of the trade impact of operational EU bilateral FTAs suggest that they 
increase bilateral trade significantly10. 
 
Trade opening leads to higher productivity and thereby contributes to increased external 
competitiveness of EU industries. Chen et al, for example, estimated that productivity in 
                                                 
7 A. Winters, "Trade liberalisation and economic performance: an overview", Economic Journal, 114, 2004,  and 
R. Wooster, S. Dube and T.M. Banda (2006) "The contribution of intra-regional and extra-regional trade to 
growth: evidence from the EU",  
8 F. Rodriguez & D. Rodrik (2001) "Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-
National Evidence," NBER wp 7081. 
9 R. Chang, L. Kaltani, N. V. Loayza (2009) "Openness can be good for growth: The role of policy 
complementarities", Journal of Development Economics 90 (2009) 33–49. 
10 Copenhagen Economics (2010) "An ex-post assessment of the trade impact of EU FTAs", forthcoming 2010.  
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European manufacturing increased by 11% during the period 1988-2000, while mark-ups are 
estimated to have decreased by 1.6% in response to increased imports11. These effects are 
important in generating additional impetus for economic growth. Trade-led productivity 
increases are not only beneficial for EU economic growth and external competitiveness but 
also for the domestic consumer. European consumers benefit from trade in two cumulative 
ways.  
 
Firstly, they benefit from lower prices as a result of trade liberalization and import 
competition. Tariff cuts lead to lower consumer prices, although the pass-through effect of 
this price transmission channel is usually imperfect. For instance, during the period 1996-
2006 import prices for textiles and clothing fell by 27.5 and 38.4 percent respectively in real 
terms (i.e. relative to the general CPI) (see Figure 2). For the same period the import price of 
consumer electronics fell by around 50%.12 
 
This effect has positive macroeconomic spill-over effects leading to an overall reduction in 
inflation as a result of trade openness and increased international competition. The existing 
literature provides ample evidence to suggest that openness leads to lower inflation. Recent 
studies suggest that this relationship is even stronger than in the past, as a result of greater 
participation in the global economy.13 
 
Figure 2  Real EU import price changes 1996-2006 (in % by sector) 
 
 
Source: Francois et al, 2007.  See footnote 13. 
 
 
Secondly, consumers benefit from trade liberalization through access to a wider variety of 
goods and services. This important but often neglected source of welfare and economic 
growth stems from the benefits that consumers reap from access to a wider range of products 
and services that meet their needs more effectively and/or at a lower cost.  It also enables EU 
                                                 
11 N. Chen, J. Imbs and A. Scott, “Competition, Globalization and the Decline of Inflation”, CEPR Discussion 
Paper Series No. 4695, 2004.  Only part of the increase in imports is due to further trade opening. 
12 J. Francois, M. Manchin, and H. Norberg, "Passing on of the benefits of trade openness to consumers", 
European Commission, Directorate General for Trade, 2007, p.7. 
13 W.C. Gruben. and D. McLeod, “The Openness- Inflation Puzzle Revisited”, Applied Economics Letters, 11, 
2004, pp.465-468. 
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firms to source a more competitive range of inputs and thereby become more competitive 
both at home and abroad. For example, a recent study estimates the gains to American 
consumers of the growth in global variety during the period 1972-2001 to be about 2.6% of 
GDP.14 Translating these "variety gains" into an EU context suggests that the average 
European consumer benefits are in the range of 600 € per year, in addition to the gains due to 
lower prices.  
 
However, European firms and consumers are not the only economic players to reap benefits 
of greater integration of the EU in the global economy. Increased trade leads to more jobs and 
higher wages.  As was shown above, trade makes a net positive contribution to economic 
growth, thanks to resources being (re-)allocated to the most efficient economic activities. 
Although such shifts sometimes give rise to adjustment costs (see next section for a more 
detailed analysis), trade does make a net positive contribution to both job creation and wage 
effects. For instance, based on a detailed analysis of the EU25 input-output tables for 2000, it 
is estimated that around 14 million jobs throughout Europe depend on exports to the rest of 
the world15. On the basis of a CGE model simulation aimed at quantifying the wage premium 
arising from the current EU trade patterns, it is estimated that the average wage in Europe 
would be 7% lower if the EU did not trade internationally. The same analysis shows that, if 
real wages are constant, abandoning EU external trade would result in an 18% drop (36 
million jobs) in EU employment16.  This indicates the significant job creation effect of the 
integration of the EU economy in the global trading system. 
 
 
Box 1  The triple benefits from trade opening 
 
• Economic growth: Finalizing the DDA and all the ongoing FTA negotiations would 
add up to 0.5% to EU GDP. Making further progress on our relations with strategic 
partners, in particular an enhanced Transatlantic Partnership with the US would 
double this growth effect. This contribution by trade policy to the EU 2020 objectives 
will be all the more important, if recovery in Europe remains subdued during the 
coming years. 
 
• Consumer benefits: the gains from wider variety of goods and services for the 
average European consumer are in the range of 600 € per year, on top of the gains 
from lower prices. 
                                                 
14 C. Broda, and D.E. Weinstein, “Globalization and the Gains from Variety”, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 2006, pp. 541-585. See also Mahler and Seitz, "The gains from variety in the European Union", 
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2010-24) and Langenfeld and Nieberding "The Benefits of Free Trade to U.S. 
Consumers", Business Economics,  40 (3), 2005, p. 41-51. 
15  A recent study published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, also based on input-output data, show 
that in 2008 US exports supported more than 10 million full-time and part-time jobs, which represented around 
6.9% of total employment. For further details see US Department of Commerce, "Export Support American 
Jobs", 2010. Downloadable at  http://trade.gov/publications/pdfs/exports-support-american-jobs.pdf.   
16  Calculations were performed on the latest version of the GTAP model and database (version 7). The 
policy shock introduced a 99% reduction in EU external trade (but continued intra-EU exchange).  Capital flows 
were restricted. This approach is similar to the simulation of, for instance, partial trade bans or trade quotas. In 
the second simulation, real wages in the EU were kept fixed.  For examples of this technique see Kurzweil, M. 
(2002), "The need for a „complete“ labor market in CGE modelling", GTAP Application, 2002 Conference 
Paper or Polaski, S. (2006), Winners and Loosers. Impact of the Doha Development Round on Developing 
Countries, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, p. 85). 
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• Labour effects: In 2000, around 14 million jobs in Europe (around 7.2% of EU 
employment) were dependent on our ability to export to the rest of the world. This 
included the jobs of those working directly for the production of exported goods and 
services as well as those employed in downstream sectors producing inputs for those 
goods17. The EU's integration in the global economy through increased trade also 
generates a wage premium: if the EU stopped trading with its external partners, real 
wages would drop by 7% on average. If wages would remain fixed, employment 
would drop by 18% (36 million jobs) instead.  
 
 
 
 
 
2) TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT 
 
This section reviews the existing literature addressing the links between  globalisation, trade 
opening, and job creation. The prevailing conclusion is that trade opening creates more jobs 
than it destroys and that most of the decline in industrial employment in the EU and other 
OECD economies is due to rapid labour-saving technical progress, not to trade opening. Trade 
openness is positively correlated with job creation. Protectionism by contrast reduces the 
competitiveness of companies and thereby destroys jobs. There is no general increase in 
unemployment in the EU, despite successive rounds of liberalization and substantial increases 
in imports from developing countries.  Most of the reduction in industrial employment is due 
to technological progress rather than to import competition. However, increased labour 
market turnover and changes in the demand for different types of skills do engender a feeling 
of insecurity. This cannot be addressed with trade policy instruments; it requires active labour 
market policies. Evidence also shows marked differences between the dynamics of labour 
markets in the EU and in developing countries as a result of trade opening. 
 
Dramatic changes have taken place in the actual volume and patterns of world trade in the last 
decades. Until the 1990s, developed countries were known as "industrialised" countries 
because they produced the bulk of manufactured goods. Developing countries were mainly 
exporters of primary products and some low-skilled manufactures such as textiles. Today, 
quite a few developing countries are much more industrialised than the former "industrialised 
countries". This is reflected in changing patterns of trade flows, as Figure 3 illustrates. 
Imports as a share of EU GDP rose from less than 5% in the late 1980s to nearly 10% in 
200818. Imports from developing countries rise faster than imports from developed countries. 
The latter are often perceived as less threatening to employment because they come from 
countries with wage rates that are comparable to those of the EU. 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Commission services estimates, based on symmetric I-O tables for the EU25 for 2000, prepared by the 
Institute for Prospective and Technological Studies (Sevilla) of the European Commission Joint Research 
Centre. The methodology used allowed to capture all downstream jobs throughout the EU associated with the 
production of inputs embodied in the goods and services exported outside the EU. 
18 GDP and trade volume are not directly comparable measures.  GDP measures value-added in production while 
trade volume is measured at the total value of products. 
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Figure 3  EU15 trade with developing and developed countries (% of GDP) 
EU15 Imports of Manufactures 
from Developed and Developing Countries, 1988-2009 (Percent of EU15 GDP)
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Developing Countries: All other countries excluding EU Member States
Manufactures: SITC Rev.3: 5, 6, 7, 8 excluding 68, excluding 891
 
Note:   Trade figures for constant EU15 membership, to avoid the bias created by EU enlargement to 27 
Member States.  Trade = sum of imports and exports of manufactured products. 
 
 
The rapid increase in imports from developing countries has led many observers to link the 
decline in manufacturing activities with the rise in unemployment in developed countries. 
Globalisation is seen as contributing to unemployment and job insecurity, unfair competition 
from low-wage low-standards countries, declining wages and rising income inequality. The 
rapid rise of China in the last decade as the premier industrial nation in the world has 
compounded this situation.  
 
The economic crisis that started in 2008, has only added to these concerns. Unemployment in 
the EU has risen from 7% in 2007 to 10% in June 2010. Although the worst of the crisis 
seems to be over, many people remain wary about the impact on their job security and 
income. This has led to knee-jerk protectionist measures such as "buy local" and "hire local" 
clauses in economic stimulus programmes, coupled with trade restrictions of various kinds. 
Whereas in good economic times it is often taken for granted that trade opening will have a 
positive labour market impact, in times of crisis this ceases to be the case, despite the positive 
contribution that trade policy could make to economic recovery. 
 
The available data confirm that increased trade openness has not led to a decline in overall 
employment in the EU or to increased unemployment. To the extent that trade stimulates 
growth (as discussed above) it will also increase employment, unless growth would be 
entirely jobless and purely driven by technological progress and productivity increases. Figure 
4 illustrates this simple correlation between trade opening and employment in the EU: 
contrary to popular perception, there is clearly a negative correlation between unemployment 
and trade opening: more trade opening goes hand in hand with less unemployment. Of course, 
this graph only illustrates a correlation; it does not explain the causal links between these 
variables. 
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There is a misguided popular perception that trade opening destroys jobs and that only exports 
create jobs. While this may be true for individuals and individual firms, the reverse is true at 
the level of an entire economy. Trade openness facilitates the integration of local companies 
in global production chains. It makes them more productive and competitive, and creates 
more employment.  More than two thirds of EU imports are imports of intermediate goods19, 
many of them much needed to ensure the competitiveness of EU companies both in Europe 
and abroad. EU exports embody an increasing amount of imported intermediates (both from 
the Internal Market and the rest of the World). In 2005 the contribution of such imports to the 
total value of EU exports ranged from 19% in the UK to more than 50% in Member States 
such as Ireland, Estonia, Hungary and Luxemburg.   
 
Figure 4  EU trade openness and employment 
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Source:  European Commission, based on Eurostat data. 
 
 
While there may be no decline in overall employment, a significant shift in employment from 
industries to services sectors is taking place, as shown in Figure 5. The fall in manufacturing 
employment is offset by an increase in services employment. This shift makes workers’ 
unease about globalisation more understandable. It leads to turnover and friction in the labour 
market and contributes to workers’ feelings of insecurity. 
Several factors may have contributed to this shift in employment. Rapid technological 
progress in manufacturing processes that can be automated more easily than services tasks 
may be one important explanation. An OECD study20 concluded that trade affects neither 
overall employment nor the unemployment rate, and that import penetration has no significant 
impact on labour demand. Other factors, such as technological change, are a more important 
cause of changes in employment patterns in industrialised countries. Clearly, in many 
                                                 
19 CEPII/CIREM (2009) "The evolution of the EU and Member States competitiveness in international trade", 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/analysis/chief-economist/ 
20 OECD (2007) "Trade and  labour market adjustments", document TAD-TC-WP(2007)7, May 2007. 
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industries, labour-saving technological progress has outpaced output growth, thereby causing 
a reduction in employment. Lastly, part of the shift of employment towards services sectors 
simply results from the statistical reallocation of outsourced services which previously were 
supplied within manufacturing enterprises (and thus counted as manufacturing employment). 
 
Figure 5  Evolution of EU employment by sector 
 
 
Source: European Commission, based on Eurostat data. 
 
 
However, trade with low-wage countries can potentially also have a major beneficial impact 
on technical change. For instance, a study drawing on a panel of over 200,000 European firms 
shows that import competition led to both within-firm technology upgrading and between-
firm reallocation of employment towards technologically more advanced firms or 
subsidiaries. These effects account for about 15-20% of technology upgrading between 2000 
and 2007 and are growing over time21. Another recent study finds that technological change 
and globalisation are associated with wage increases in nine EU Member States22. 
 
Beyond the causes of the decline in manufacturing employment, we can also look at other 
dynamics in EU labour markets and the impact of trade. But trade may also have created a 
"polarisation" of employment in recent years23. Employment has been growing both in the 
high-skilled (professional and managerial) jobs and in the lowest-skilled (personal services) 
jobs, whereas there was a decline in medium-skilled jobs in manufacturing and routine office 
jobs.  
 
                                                 
21 Nicholas Bloom, Mirko Draca, John Van Reenen (2009): "Trade induced technical change? The impact of 
Chinese imports on innovation, diffusion and productivity", Stanford university working paper. 
22 R. Christopoulou, J. F. Jimeno, A. Lamo  (2010) "Changes in the Wage Structure in EU Countries", ECB 
Working Paper No. 1199, April 2010.  
23 M. Goos, A. Manning, A. Salomons (2009) "Job polarization in Europe", American Economic Review, 2009 
vol 99(2) pp 58-63. 
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The polarization of employment is not unique to the EU; it has also been observed in the 
US24. In the 1980s, employment at the bottom of the educational ladder was declining and it 
increased as education levels rose. In the 1990s and 2000s, employment growth has been 
concentrated in the lowest skilled and the highest skilled jobs.  Goos et al. test two potential 
causes of these changes in the observed job structure for 16 EU Member States, namely task-
biased technological progress and off-shoring. Their results support the routinization 
hypothesis: technology can more easily replace human labour in routine tasks, such as 
manufacturing jobs. The estimated employment impact of off-shoring is much smaller and 
less pervasive than technological progress. 
 
This leads to the conclusion that it is technological progress rather than trade opening that is 
driving the decline in manufacturing jobs. Trade policy instruments are unable to address 
these employment concerns. Other types of policy instruments, such as active labour market 
and re-training policies, and income redistribution policies to address income inequality 
concerns, are more appropriate. 
 
Among the developing countries, emerging market economies have successfully made use of 
their comparative advantage in low-skilled labour and integrated themselves in the global 
economy.  They have registered high GDP and employment growth rates. Others countries 
didn't – mostly the least developed economies. Emerging market economies saw a major shift 
in labour from low-productivity agricultural employment to higher-productivity industrial 
employment. In China for instance, hundreds of millions of workers moved from rural 
agriculture to urban manufacturing employment, mostly in coastal areas. 
 
Several other interactions may add to the complexity of trade-labour interlinkages in 
developing countries. For instance, research has shown that a decline in tariffs on outputs 
reduces wages in firms that sell in the domestic market but raises wages in firms that are 
export oriented. In turn, a decline in tariffs on inputs raises wages in firms using more 
imported inputs but reduces wages in firms that do not import inputs. In short, the more 
globalised the firm the more positive the impact of tariff opening on wages25. In developing 
countries unskilled workers in expanding sectors gain while they lose in the previously 
protected sectors. However, the problem is that, for understandable socio-political reasons, 
many countries often protect sectors that employ large numbers of unskilled workers while 
expanding export sectors employ the most skilled workers, even in countries that have an 
abundance of unskilled workers. This prevents the expected benefits of trade opening from 
being evenly distributed. 
 
In summary, developed countries have experienced a noticeable decline in manufacturing 
employment mostly due to rapid technological progress but the decline has been more than 
compensated by an increase in services employment. Wages increased for those remaining in 
manufacturing, despite a considerable degree of labour churning and declining job security. 
However wages for workers who have moved to services sectors may decline unless they are 
based on high skill levels.  On balance however, total employment in developed countries 
increased, and incomes rose because technological progress, combined with global trade 
opening, drove further specialisation and the skill premiums that go with specialisation. 
                                                 
24 "The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization of the U.S. Labor Market", David Autor and 
David Dorn, MIT Working Paper, August 2010. Paul Krugman (2008) "Trade and wages reconsidered", 
Brookings Papers.  
25 Mary Amiti & Donald R. Davis, 2008. "Trade, Firms, and Wages: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working 
Papers 14106, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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Manufacturing employment in emerging markets increased strongly, as did wages. Developed 
and developing countries alike saw an increasing skills premium on wages, leading to greater 
income inequality. Labour market concerns in developed economies are not only about 
overall (un)employment levels but also about job insecurity and turnover, and possible wage 
losses in that process, combined with the inequities of growing income inequality because of 
skills premiums.  
 
It is the responsibility of the Member States to put in place the appropriate social, educational 
and labour market flanking measures to tackle these potential risk factors associated with 
trade opening, as part of the European Employment Strategy. The Commission promotes 
these social policies, including decent work and corporate social responsibility, with the EU's 
main trading partners, in international fora (i.e ILO, G20, OECD, UN) and in bilateral and 
regional cooperation settings (notably the US, Canada, China, India, Japan, South Africa, 
Russia and Brazil, and ASEM and Latin America).  
 
To assist the Member States' efforts, the European Union has created the European 
Globalisation Adjustment Fund. 
 
Box 2  The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) 
 
 
The EGF is designed to help those workers who lose their jobs as a result of changing global 
trade patterns, so that they can be reintegrated into employment as quickly as possible.  The 
EGF complements national policies. Up to € 500 million per year can be used for retraining 
and job search activities, and other active labour market measures in shared management with 
the Member States. The potential budget looks sufficient for the time being but will be 
reviewed in the context of the Multiannual Financial Framework. An increase should be 
considered if the eligibility criteria are broadened. It is not always straightforward for the 
applicant Member States to find official and recent data in support of their cases.  
 
Other EU funds with similar purposes include the European Social Fund (ESF) and the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The ERDF also supports long-term structural 
adjustment through investments in R&D, innovation and ICT. 
 
The ESF can also be used for training, structural reforms and employment creation and 
provides a longer term support, in contrast to the EGF which provides support on a one-off 
time-limited basis.  Any sector can benefit from funding, including agriculture. However, 
since the issues faced by agricultural workers are rather different, this sector might be better 
supported by other Funds. Furthermore, most of the workforce in agriculture is self-employed. 
National measures and certain funds under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are 
available in order for them to adapt to structural changes. There might be potential for 
improving the assistance provided to the agricultural sector in order to help it adjust to the 
effects of globalisation. 
 
Whereas the EGF has only been in operation since the beginning of 2007, the US has a 
somewhat similar programme since 1962, known as the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). 
There are three different TAAs; one for workers, one for firms and one for farmers. The TAA 
for workers only covers certain sectors, and also pays for unemployment and health insurance.  
It has a flexible and ambitious training programme. The TAA for farmers was created in 2002 
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and amended in 2009. It helps producers of raw agricultural commodities (not processed 
agricultural products) and fishermen adjust to changing economic environment associated 
with import competition. To be eligible farmer have to suffer a 15% decrease in national 
average price, quantity of production, value of production, or cash receipts compared to the 
average of the three preceding marketing years, and imports have to contribute significantly to 
this decline. In 2010, the producers of three commodities were certified as eligible for TAA: 
asparagus, catfish and shrimp. Technical assistance and cash can be provided to develop and 
implement business adjustment plans (up to $12.000). 
 
 
 
 
3) THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS ON TRADE 
The previous section presented a longer-term view of the positive link between trade 
openness, growth and employment. Some have questioned whether this view remains valid in 
times of economic crisis. Here we explore the trade policy aspects of the 2008-2009 economic 
crisis and argue that trade openness is still the best policy solution. The crisis may have 
changed economic prospects among regions, but trade will be fundamental to fostering the 
recovery of global growth.  
 
Figure 6  Annual variation in GDP and trade (in %) 
 
Source: IMF, Eurostat 
 
 
The financial crisis of 2008, which erupted in the real estate and banking sector in the US, 
quickly spread to credit markets across the globe and spilled over into non-financial "real" 
economy sectors. The result was a full blown global recession and an almost unprecedented 
contraction of world trade (see Figure 6) mainly driven by the sharp and synchronised slump 
in demand on key markets, in particular for investment goods and consumer durables which 
make up a large part of international (and EU) trade. Trade in goods and services fell 11.3% 
worldwide in 2009, the largest annual decline since the Great Depression26. Europe was also 
hit hard and its exports fell back to 2005 levels at the peak of the crisis between August 2008 
                                                 
26  IMF World Economic Outlook, July 2010.  
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and June 2009. For 2009 as a whole, the volume of EU exports of goods and services were 
down 15.6% while imports declined by around 14%.  
 
The scale and speed of the contagion of the downturn took many by surprise and provided a 
stark reminder of how integrated global markets have become. Trade was not a cause of the 
crisis but from the outset there were concerns that the heavy social burden of the crisis could 
trigger a wave of protectionist measures, as in the 1930s and 1970s, which would have 
deepened and prolonged the crisis27. However, the WTO legal framework and trade 
disciplines proved their worth by substantially reducing the scope for the introduction of 
protectionist measures, especially with regard to tariff increases beyond "bound" levels agreed 
at the WTO. Furthermore, the awareness of the lack of binding WTO disciplines on non-tariff 
barriers led to a preventive and internationally coordinated pledge to keep markets open, 
buttressed by repeated pro-trade commitments from the G20.  
 
Box 3  Why did trade fall so sharply in 2008-2009? 
 
 
The consensus among analysts and policymakers is that the fall in trade was primarily a 
consequence of the sharp and synchronised slump in demand on key world markets following 
the deterioration of consumers and investors' expectations in the wake of the near collapse of 
the global financial system in 200828. The contraction of demand was most pronounced in 
investment goods and consumer durables that make up a larger share of global (and EU) trade 
than output, which led to trade activity contracting more than proportionally in relation to 
output. Other factors have also contributed to the contraction of global trade activity, 
particularly the drying up of short-term trade finance. The development of extensive cross-
border production linkages over the past decades has also been highlighted by many as a 
factor exacerbating the global trade collapse. However, the analyses around this issue remain 
inconclusive. The international fragmentation of production can indeed contribute to 
propagate the demand shock across the world, which intensifies the global trade contraction29. 
However, its role in exacerbating the fall in trade relative to the fall in output is less 
straightforward. On the one hand, global production chains magnify the decline in trade 
associated when new obstacles to trade emerge (such as shortage of trade finance and the 
introduction of protectionist measures). On the other hand, the sunk costs of putting together 
international production chains and the long-term contractual ties linking the firms involved 
may alleviate the drop in trade in the face of an adverse shock in demand. Moreover, if trade 
finance is in short supply, there is more scope for intra-firm financing instruments to pick up 
some of the slack in the banking sector. 
 
                                                 
27 The global economic downturn caused an unprecedented 34 million job losses worldwide since 2007, taking 
the number of unemployed people to over 212 million in 2009 and the global unemployment rate to a peak of 
6.6%, see ILO, "Global Employment Trends", 2010, available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09332/09332%282010-January%29.pdf.  B. Eichengreen and D. Irwin, 
"The slide to protectionism in the Great Depression: Who succumbed and why?” NBER Working Paper No. 
15142, 2009, and F. Erixon, "Protectionism is on the rise", available at: 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3074. 
28 For a detailed analysis see: R. Baldwin (ed), "The great trade collapse: causes, consequences and prospects", a 
VoxEU.org publication CEPR, 2009, available at: http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4297. 
29 It is important to keep in mind that in many economies it is increasingly the case that not only exports but also 
imports are dependent on foreign demand. 
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Nevertheless, protectionism has not been fully contained. There has been some slippage - 
albeit limited - in a number of countries (including most G20 partners). The WTO estimated 
that, between October 2008 and October 2009 new import restrictions introduced by G20 
members affected not more than 1% of world imports30. By mid-February 2010 the volume of 
world imports potentially affected by additional measures had fallen to 0.4%. At the peak of 
the crisis, around 1.7% of EU merchandise exports were affected31. The important trade 
policy lesson to be learned here is that, at a time of major strain, the WTO proved its worth. 
However, it is important not to overlook the loopholes in the multilateral trade rules that 
provide scope for protectionism to emerge via “beyond-the-border” barriers (particularly the 
introduction of discriminatory subsidies and "buy local" public procurement practices). 
 
Box 4  Multilateral rules and EU trade interests in the global economic crisis 
 
 
Most new border restrictions (including tariffs, quotas, import licenses, reference prices, and 
import bans) were imposed by few relatively small EU trading partners. Russia, which is not 
yet a WTO member, was the clear exception, offering a glimpse of what might have happened 
without the current WTO trade rules. The border measures introduced by Russia between 
October 2008 and October 2009 accounted for almost three quarters of the 1.7% of EU global 
exports that were affected by protectionist measures. This shows the importance of the WTO 
in preventing a 1930s-style protectionist spiral. Although WTO members countries such as 
Bolivia, South Africa, Egypt, and Indonesia have made extensive use of their "policy space", 
including raising applied tariffs to bound levels, the WTO system of rules has effectively 
provided a legal basis for the withdrawal of trade-damaging policy initiatives by Ukraine and 
Ecuador, countries which resorted to inappropriate trade measures to tackle balance of 
payment crises.  
 
 
By the end of 2009, the world economy started to recover more quickly than expected on the 
back of historically loose fiscal and monetary policies, and so did trade. By June 2010, global 
trade volumes had climbed 24% above their lowest point, which was in May 2009 (although 
they were still 2% below the April 2008 peak).  This rebound is expected to continue as world 
trade volumes are set to expand by 9% in 2010 and by 6.3% in 201132.  
 
By contrast with previous global downturns, the current recovery is being led by the emerging 
economies, which have rapidly returned to the impressive pre-crisis growth rates, after a sharp 
slowdown to 2.5% in 200933. This renewed economic dynamism is associated with a strong 
rebound in trade flows across these economies, which bounced back to pre-crisis levels (see 
Figure 7). Although some of this trade expansion is intra-regional (in particular across Asia 
given the buoyant demand in the region) it nonetheless provides crucial support to the 
                                                 
30 See 2nd joint report by WTO, OECD and UNCTAD for the G20 on the monitoring of the crisis-related trade 
and investment related measures, March 2010. Downloadable at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wto_oecd_unctad2010d1_en.pdf  
31 Between October 2008 and October 2009. 
32 IMF World Economic Outlook, July 2010. 
33 Around 6.5% is foreseen for in 2010-11, according to the IMF World Economic Outlook, July 2010. 
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recovery in developed economies, including the EU, where the macroeconomic situation 
remains more tenuous. 
 
 
Figure 7  Evolution of trade volumes (January 1995 – May 2010) 
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Source: CPB World Trade Monitor. Advanced economies are defined as OECD excluding Turkey, Mexico, 
Korea and Central European countries. 
 
 
 
The major financial and economic shock which many advanced economies (notably the EU 
and the US) experienced in 2008/2009 will have lasting consequences for the public, private 
and financial sectors, which could hold back domestic demand (also weakened by high levels 
of unemployment) for some time to come. In particular, the unprecedented expansion of 
public spending to stabilise these economies is giving way to increased pressure to 
consolidate fiscal positions; a process that will weigh on their short-term growth prospects34.  
 
In the EU, the process of fiscal adjustment was precipitated in order to respond to investors' 
concerns about the future of the euro-area. Moreover, the recovery from the unprecedented 
4.1% contraction in GDP suffered in 2009 will be further slowed down by long-standing 
structural weaknesses of the European economy (in particular product and labour market 
rigidities)35,36.  If the current growth forecasts prove correct, it could take more than three 
                                                 
34 Advanced economies are expected to expand by 2.6% in 2010 and 2.4% in 2011, following a decline in output 
of 3.2 % in 2009, see IMF World Economic Outlook, July 2010. 
35 "The evolution of EU and its Member States' competitiveness in international trade", report for DG Trade, 
downloadable at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/march/tradoc_142475.pdf  
36 EU exports of goods and services (in volume) are due expand 5% in 2010 and 5.2% in 2011, see European 
Economic Forecast: Spring 2010, downloadable at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2010/pdf/ee-2010-2_en.pdf 
  21 
years for output in Europe to return to pre-crisis levels, and unemployment is unlikely to fall 
below 10%37 (see Figure 8) 
 
 
Figure 8  Growth in global trade 1980-2011 (annual % change) 
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Nonetheless, the shifting of the burden of the global recovery away from developed 
economies towards emerging economies is likely to weigh considerably on the future 
prospects for global trade growth38. Although the long-term rise of the developing and 
emerging countries is set to accelerate, the advanced economies were absorbing as much as 
50% of world imports before the crisis 39,40. The question arises as to whether the dynamism 
of emerging economies alone will be sufficient to take up the slack and sustain global demand 
growth in the coming years. 
 
 
 
 
4) GLOBAL TRADE IMBALANCES  
 
 
Against this background of relatively subdued demand growth in some key world markets in 
the medium-run, a sustainable growth path for global trade requires that the ongoing process 
of macroeconomic adjustment must also include a greater contribution to world aggregate 
                                                 
37 The EU Commission, IMF and World Bank macroeconomic projections converge in pointing to an EU GDP 
growth rate of around 1% in 2010. For 2011, EU GDP is foreseen to grow less than 2%.  
38 Trade growth will also be affected in the medium-run by new regulations to be introduced in the financial 
sector in the wake of the crisis of 2008-9. The revision of the prudential framework for banks (Basel III) may 
bring the rules governing trade and export finance in line with other financial instruments.  
39 Some long-term projections point to a 60% share of world GDP by 2030 (up from around 50% in 2010), see 
OECD, “Perspectives on Global Development: Shifting Wealth”, 2010 
40 The share of imports EU27, US, Japan, and Canada in total world imports of goods totalled 46.5% in 2007 
(Source: WTO, Eurostat).   
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demand from those economies (both advanced and emerging) which ran large current account 
surpluses. Such a process would also place the world economy on a sounder footing by 
contributing to the orderly unwinding of the global imbalances that have built up over the past 
decade. The substantial increase in China's trade surplus since 2004 - mirrored by a 
deterioration of the US trade balance - is widely regarded as a major source of instability for 
the global trade and financial system.   Despite some reduction in 2009, recent data suggest 
that these trade gaps widen again as the global economy moves out of the crisis.     
 
 
 
Figure 9  Trade balance (goods and services) for the EU, US and China  
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It is important to bear in mind that the growing internationalisation of production processes 
which we have witnessed over the past decades strongly advises caution in interpreting these 
bilateral trade gaps in particular as regards the conclusions to be drawn about the 
competitiveness of different industries vis-à-vis other trade partners. For some countries, such 
as China, looking at gross trade flows leads to overestimating the "true" value of exports and 
to inflating trade surpluses vis-à-vis other countries due to the high incorporation of imported 
inputs in domestic production41,42. Nonetheless, at a macroeconomic level the issue remains as 
                                                 
41 Estimates for the gap between trade in value added terms and gross terms vary greatly across bilateral trade 
relation even among developed economies. US exports to Canada are found to be 50% smaller measured in 
value added terms than grows terms whereas US exports to France the two measurements show no significant 
difference in 2001. Estimates for US-China trade show that imbalance is approximately 15-30% smaller when 
measured in value added rather than gross terms, see R. Johnson and G. Noguera, "Accounting for 
intermediates: production sharing and trade in value added", mimeo, 2009. 
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trade gaps reflect an underlying situation in which excessive aggregate consumption in deficit 
countries is matched by excessive savings in the surplus economies.   
 
The role of exchange rates in an adjustment such as this is difficult to pin down. Market-based 
exchange rate adjustments can in principle contribute to the unwinding of global trade 
imbalances. The absence of such a mechanism for the renminbi, which until June 2010 was 
pegged to the US dollar, is generally identified as a major factor behind China's large and 
persistent trade surpluses43. This is putting China in the spotlight, facing accusations of 
keeping the currency artificially undervalued in order to boost export competitiveness at the 
expense of trade partners44. A broad-based appreciation of the renminbi, together with 
appropriate structural reforms can have a positive impact on China's economy as well as the 
global economy.  
 
The value of the Euro has fluctuated considerably since its introduction in 1999. However, the 
appreciation of the euro since 2001 has not prevented a steady increase in euro-area trade 
surpluses (excluding volatile energy products), as can be seen in Figure 10.  This does not 
mean that fluctuations in the value of the euro have no impact on EU trade flows. On the 
contrary, recent empirical analyses suggest that euro-area trade flows respond significantly to 
exchange rate variations45). All things being equal, a depreciation of 1% in the value of the 
real exchange rate of the euro is due to lead to a long-run 0.5% increase in the value of 
exports and to a 0.6% long-run decrease in the value of imports46. However, this effect might 
be overtaken by macroeconomic changes. More specifically, during most of the last decade 
the rising demand for EU goods in emerging market economies may have offset the negative 
impact on EU exports one, which would normally be expected from an appreciation of the 
euro47.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
42 R. Koopman, Z. Whang, and Shang-Jin Wei, "How much of Chinese exports is really made in China? 
Assessing domestic value-added when processing trade is pervasive", NBER Working Paper 14109, 2008. 
43 China's market interventions have also led to the build up of massive foreign currency reserves, which have 
trebled since 2005 to a peak of $ 2.4 trillion by December 2009.  
44 Several estimates point to the likely undervaluation of the renminbi albeit in varying degrees (from -50% to -
3%) due to different methodological approaches and sample sizes, see for example W. Cline, “Estimating 
consistent fundamental exchange rates”, Working paper 08-6, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
2008; A. Benassy-Quére, S. Bereau and V. Mignon, “Equilibrium exchange rates: a guide book for the euro-
dollar rate”, CEPII working paper 2008-02, CEPII, 2008; Y. Cheung, M. Chinn and E. Fujii, “China’s current 
account and exchange rate”, NBER working paper 14673, 2008; H. Reisen, “Is China’s currency overvalued?, 
in S. Evenett (ed.) “The US-Sino currency dispute: New insights from economics, politics and law”, a 
VoxEU.org publication CEPR, 2010, and A. Subramanian, “New PPP-based estimates of renminbi 
undervaluation and policy implications, in S. Evenett (ed), “The US-Sino currency dispute: New insights from 
economics, politics and law”, a VoxEU.org publication CEPR, 2010. In general, more recent estimates point 
to a reduction in the degree of undervaluation of the currency. However, given the statistical and data 
uncertainties definite claims in this regard are difficult to make. For a more in-depth discussion see also: 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1636.  
45 European Commission, "Quarterly report on the Euro Area", (9(2), 2010, p. 6-7.  
46 The increasing cross-border fragmentation of production processes also has an impact on the responsiveness of 
trade flows to variation in exchange rates. More specifically, as exported output makes greater use of imported 
inputs, the elasticity of exports to exchange rate variations is due to decrease because, in case of appreciations, 
firms benefit from lower import prices of intermediates.  
47 The identification of clear cut effects of exchange rates adjustments is further complicated if the nature of the 
underlying shock (e.g. changes in investors' risk premium, market intervention,…) is taken into account. This 
may fundamentally determine the global outcome in the long-run given that second round effects on demand 
and capital flows may offset (particularly or fully) the initial effects associated with changes in price 
competitiveness positions among trading partners. 
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Figure 10  Euro area trade balance and nominal effective exchange rate 
 
 
To conclude, at this point in time a policy objective consistent with the long-run stability of 
the world economy should be for countries with unsustainable external imbalances to move 
closer to more balanced current account positions. The challenge is to steer the necessary 
rebalancing of the world economy mainly on the basis of coordinated macroeconomic 
policymaking (and through the implementation of structural reforms to manage the necessary 
domestic adjustments), and to avoid the temptation to use trade policy either to accelerate or 
hamper the process, as this would only lead to a reduction in global welfare. 
 
This move towards a more balanced world economy, which will increasingly rely on the 
dynamic emerging countries to support global demand, will form the backdrop against which 
the EU economic policy over the coming years must be defined. Simultaneously faced with 
the twin challenge of fiscal consolidation and curbing unemployment, the EU must project 
itself into a path of higher potential growth through a combination of structural reforms and 
greater openness to trade if it is to remain competitive in the new global economic landscape. 
Trade openness will provide not only a source of new demand (particularly in the emerging 
market economies), but also much needed efficiency gains by providing access to lower cost 
inputs, exposure to competition pressure and incentives to innovation. The role of trade policy 
will be crucial in ensuring that potential market opportunities translate into additional 
businesses and jobs.  
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III THE CURRENT STATE OF BARRIERS AFFECTING EU TRADE 
 
In the aftermath of the 2008-2009 economic crisis, the overall objective of the EU, as 
confirmed in the European Commission's Europe 2020 Strategy48, is to stimulate smart, 
sustainable and inclusive economic growth and jobs.  The bulk of global economic growth in 
the next couple of years is expected to come from Emerging Market Economies (EMEs). 
Economic growth in high-income countries, including in the EU, is expected to remain rather 
subdued as a result of weak domestic demand resulting notably from continued pressure on 
governments to balance their budgets. A rebalancing of macro-economic policies is required 
to unwind global unbalances in an orderly manner. Growth in EMEs will need to be more 
domestic demand driven. That rebalancing should be achieved through domestic economic 
policy instruments, not trade policy instruments. 
 
 
Figure 11  Contributions to global GDP growth (in %, PPP basis , 3 year moving 
average) 
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Growth in the EU will need to come primarily from exports, structural reforms and 
innovation. This will require close coordination of EU trade and domestic policy instruments.  
 
EU trade policy instruments contribute to the overall objective of growth and jobs.  Bilateral 
free trade negotiations to improve market access for EU exports in EMEs were already 
launched under Global Europe. Once these Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) will be in force, 
tariff barriers for EU exports to most EMEs will be close to zero.  EU import tariffs are 
already very low and will be further reduced by these FTAs, thereby improving competitive 
                                                 
48 See http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/index_en.htm 
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supplies for EU industries. The only remaining significant tariffs will then be limited to trade 
between the EU and its most important trading partners: the US, Japan, China and Russia.  
Completion of the multilateral Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations would further 
reduce these, except for Russia which is not yet a WTO member. The EU is already among 
the most open economies in the world, but does not always face the same level of access in 
other countries. The EU should remain an open economy, but not a disarmed economy.  
 
 
Box 5  The economic benefits of WTO membership 
 
 
The evolution of the multilateral trading system under the GATT and WTO has led to the 
creation of a strong set of rules and a well-functioning organization. In addition to the global 
set of rules, the WTO is also providing the legal basis for ensuring compliance through its 
dispute settlement system. At the same time however, it is also true that developed countries 
have pursued trade liberalization to a greater extent and in more areas covered by the WTO 
agreements than developing country members. For instance, under successive rounds of trade 
negotiations, developed countries have successfully reduced their average tariffs from over 15 
percent in 1947 to about 4.5 percent today.49 For instance, world imports are higher by about 
120%, compared to a "world without WTO" counterfactual.50  
 
But this "pro-trade" WTO effect is uneven across countries and sectors. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the benefits of WTO membership are also strongly correlated to the degree of 
participation in the system by different countries and the depth of their commitments. Hence, 
developing countries seem to have benefited less from the WTO system, particularly in those 
multilateral rounds where their participation was limited. The same story holds true for 
sectors that were subject to ambitious trade liberalization and those that were exempted or 
subject to various exceptions and flexibilities.  
 
WTO membership is also found to promote trade at the "extensive margin", i.e. not only to 
expand existing trade volumes but also to act as a "trade facilitator" and diversify the set of 
exported products. WTO membership is associated with lower levels of export concentration 
and WTO members have 12 percent more trading partners than non-members.51 
 
 
 
The trade costs of non-tariff barriers remain high however, due to regulatory differences 
between trading partners, barriers to services trade and investments, and restricted access to 
public procurement markets. Trade agreements can address these non-tariff barriers to some 
extent. However, the modern consensus in international economics is that openness needs to 
be combined with domestic institutional and regulatory reform in order to successfully drive 
economic growth. That requires a seamless connection between internal and external policy 
reforms. In order to strengthen the EU's competitive edge in global markets and enable EU 
citizens and workers to benefit more from globalisation, domestic regulatory reforms should 
                                                 
49 Arvind Subramanian and Shang-Jin Wei, 'The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly But Unevenly', Journal of 
International Economics 72 (2007) 151–175.   
50 Subramanian and Wei, op. cit.  
51 Felbermayr and Kohler, "Does WTO membership make a difference at the extensive margin of world trade?", 
CESIFO working paper nr 1898, January 2007. 
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be carried out while bearing in mind their impact on the global competitiveness of EU 
industries. This chapter provides evidence on the level of regulatory and services trade 
barriers and the potential benefits for a reduction in regulatory differences among major 
partner countries.  In order to ensure inclusive growth and job creation, labour market 
flanking measures need to be put in place to address the structural changes taking place in 
European labour markets, mainly as a result of rapid technological progress, both at home and 
in partner countries, and the re-organisation of industries and services along global production 
supply chains.  
 
 
 
1) TARIFFS ON GOODS  
 
Under the terms of the WTO agreements, countries are not normally allowed to discriminate 
between their trading partners. This principle is known as most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
treatment. However, some exceptions are allowed. For example, countries can set up a free 
trade agreement (FTA) that applies only to trade within the group of countries party to such 
FTA and discriminating against goods from outside, or they can give developing countries 
unilateral access to their markets. 
 
As a result of numerous bilateral and regional preferential trade agreements and unilateral 
schemes, including the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for developing countries, 
the EU MFN regime applies to only nine WTO Members - Australia, Canada, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, China52, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore and the United States.53 It also 
generally applies to non-WTO members unless they are eligible to any other form of 
preferences. 
 
The preferential treatment which countries enjoy on the EU market varies according to 
whether a country (i) is entitled to preferences under the GSP (including the Everything but 
Arms (EBA) initiative)54, (ii) has signed a bilateral or regional FTA, including Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs), with the EU, or entered into a customs union with the EU 
(Andorra, San Marino and Turkey). 
 
Table 3 distinguishes between three broad categories of EU trading partners:55  
• countries that have operational free trade agreement (FTA) or customs union with the 
EU 
• countries with on-going or planned FTA negotiations with the EU, or concluded but not 
yet implemented FTAs, and  
                                                 
52 China has to a large extent graduated from the EU's generalised system of preferences (GSP) so de facto MFN 
tariffs apply to all but 150 million Euro of China's imports into the EU. 
53 FTA negotiations with Korea are concluded and negotiations are on-going with Canada and Singapore.  
54 The objective of the GSP is to contribute to the reduction of poverty and the promotion of sustainable 
development and good governance. All developing countries are eligible. 
55 See lists of EU ongoing and existing preferential (trade) agreements at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf and 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_111588.pdf. The EU has bilateral trade agreements 
for textile products with Belarus, Russia, Serbia, and Uzbekistan. Only textiles originating in Belarus are subject 
to quantitative restrictions. Quantitative restrictions also apply to EU imports of textiles from the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea. 
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• countries with which there are no on-going or planned negotiations for FTAs. These 
include the EU's main trading partners: US, Japan, China and Russia. 
 
In 2009, EU goods imports totalled €1,200 billion. In terms of industrial products, the first 
two groups of countries account for a little more than 20% each, while the third group 
accounts for more than 55% of EU imports (see Table 4). The remaining 5% of EU imports 
come from remaining countries, most of which are relatively small in economic terms. EU 
goods exports amounted to close to €1,100 billion in 2009. The shares of the first two country 
groups in total EU exports of industrial goods of some 25% are somewhat higher than their 
import shares, while the export share of the third group - at about 47% - is lower than its 
import share. 
 
EU industrial imports exceed agricultural imports by a factor of about 12 to 1. However, the 
relative share of agricultural imports varies considerably by country group (see Table 5). For 
example, the share of EU imports of agricultural products from the second group of countries 
is over 55% (compared to some 20% for industrial products), while the opposite is true for the 
third group. EU exports of agricultural goods account for about 7% of exports of industrial 
products. The third group of countries is the main recipient, accounting for almost 45% of EU 
exports of agricultural products. 
 
From the point of view of tariffs, the EU is an open market. The common external tariff trade 
weighted tariff for industrial products stands at 1.6% when bilateral FTAs and autonomous 
preferential tariffs are taken into account. For those countries that have an operational FTA 
with the EU, the trade-weighted tariff on industrial goods is 0.3%. About 94% of imports 
from these countries come in duty free (or under positive preferential tariffs). Some positive 
non-preferential tariffs may still remain, especially in agriculture, and partners may not 
always use the preferential regime, as the preference utilisation rate of around 90% shows.56  
 
The current average EU tariff on industrial imports from countries with on-going or planned 
FTA negotiations is already quite low, at 1.5%. Most of these are developing countries that 
already benefit from autonomous GSP preferences. Between 80% and 90% of EU imports 
from these countries are either duty free or at a preferential rate of duty (except for the 
ASEAN and the group of Other FTAs, for which the figure is about 70%) and the rate of 
preference utilisation is relatively high at 75%. Most of the on-going and planned FTA 
negotiations were launched under the "Global Europe" trade strategy, including with ASEAN, 
India and Korea. Others had already started (Gulf Cooperation Council and Mercosur) or 
were added subsequently (Canada, Libya). If all these negotiations were to result in an FTA 
that eliminates tariffs on substantially all trade in goods, it is estimated that the tariff for these 
countries would be brought down to 0.2%. The overall EU import tariff would then be further 
reduced from 1.6% to 1.3% (trade weighted). 
 
In the third group, most countries are subject to the MFN tariff. The only exceptions here are 
China, which still has access to GSP preferences for a small volume of products, and Russia. 
The countries in the third group face an EU import tariff of 2.3%.57 Still, for the major 
                                                 
56 The lower preference utilisation rate of the Caribbean EPA is due to relatively low use of preferences in 
Mineral fuels and oils. 
57 This figure reflects significant volumes of duty free energy imports from Russia. Excluding Russia from this 
grouping would increase the trade-weighted EU import tariff to 2.7%. 
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partners in group 3, nearly 60% of EU imports of industrial products were not dutiable in 
2009. In other words, these imports were subject to an MFN tariff of 0%.58  
 
The last column of Table 4 shows that the level of tariffs on EU exports of industrial products 
is higher than the corresponding tariffs on EU imports of these products.59 The level of tariffs 
on EU exports to group 1 - which is about 1% - reflects the existence of the preferential 
trading arrangement (although it is not fully phased-in in the case of the Mediterranean 
countries and is just at the beginning of the phasing-in process as far as the Caribbean EPA is 
concerned). Tariffs applying to EU exports on markets in group 2 are higher; the trade 
weighted average for the group is over 5%, and it is particularly high in Mercosur, at nearly 
12%.  
 
The average tariff faced by EU exports on the markets of the major partners in group 3 stands 
at 3.3%, and the conclusion of all on-going and planned FTA negotiations will not change that 
situation. About half of EU exports will still face MFN treatment on their largest export 
markets60. However, the main barriers to EU exports to these countries are likely to be of a 
non-tariff nature. 
 
The tariffs of both the EU and its trading partners on agricultural goods remain higher than on 
manufactured goods. According to Commission estimates the ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) 
of EU MFN tariffs on agricultural imports is slightly above 10%. Table 5 displays the AVEs 
for the individual country groupings.  
 
Table 5 further shows that the share of EU agricultural imports entering the EU market free of 
duties or under preferences is around 50% for the partners in country group 3, 70% for 
country group 2 with planned FTAs and 80% for group 1 with FTAs in force. EU trade 
preferences are well used in agriculture. The last column of Table 5 shows that the trade 
weighted average tariff on EU agricultural exports is into double digits on most destination 
markets. As in the case of industrial products, the relatively high tariffs of the EPA Caribbean 
and the Mediterranean countries reflect the fact that the FTAs with these partners are not yet 
fully phased-in. 
                                                 
58 Strictly speaking the figure is somewhat lower since some EU imports from China and Russia are still eligible 
for the GSP.  
59 The figures come from the Market Access Database (MADB), 
http://mkaccdb.eu.int/mkaccdb2/indexPubli.htm. One should recall that not all the countries of all the country 
groupings are represented in the MADB when interpreting the figures. 
60 It should be noted here that Russia is not a member of the WTO.  
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Table 3  EU Free Trade Agreements, by status 
 
Group Status Country Note 
1 FTA (or 
customs union) 
in force  
Chile, Mexico, South Africa Dev. country FTAs 
  
Andorra, San Marino, Turkey, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland 
European Free Trade 
Association and Customs 
Unions 
  
Caribbean ACP 
Economic Partnership 
Agreement 
  Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Tunisia 
Mediterranean  
countries, FTAs 
  Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia 
Western Balkans, 
Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements 
2 Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru Andean Community 
 
FTA concluded 
but not yet 
applied, or 
negotiations 
on-going or 
planned 
Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Vietnam 
ASEAN 
  Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama 
Central America 
  Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) 
  Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay MERCOSUR 
  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Canada, Georgia, 
India, Korea, Libya, Moldova, Syria, 
Ukraine 
Other FTAs 
  
African and Pacific ACPs 
Economic Partnership 
Agreements 
China, Japan, Russia, United States, 
Australia, New Zealand 
Major partners 
3 No FTA 
Rest of the world (~ 70 countries)  
 
Source: DG Trade 
Note:  completed FTA negotiations in Group 2 in italics
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Table 4:  EU imports and exports of goods, by trading partner and trade agreement status (2009, in %) 
 
Regions and FTA status   EU import regime  
Tariffs faced by EU 
exports 
b
 
  
Share of EU 
imports 
Trade weighted  
EU import tariffs 
a
 
Imports duty-free and 
under preferences 
Preference 
utilisation 
Share of EU 
exports 
Trade weighted  
tariff 
1. FTA in force 22.3 0.3 93.9 90.8 27.7 1.2 
Developing countries 2.5 0.3 90.8 79.8 3.4 0.8 
EFTA and Customs Union 14.6 0.2 93.9 92.5 15.9 0.0 
EPA Caribbean 0.3 0.3 92.5 70.4 0.3 6.9 
Mediterranean FTAs 4.0 0.2 96.6 93.2 5.9 4.7 
Western Balkans 0.9 0.8 91.8 90.0 2.2 0.7 
2. FTA concluded but not yet applied, or 
negotiations on-going or planned 
21.8 1.5 77.1 75.9 25.6 5.4 
Andean 0.4 0.1 92.2 78.1 0.6 5.0 
ASEAN 5.4 2.1 71.3 62.3 4.6 4.2 
Central America 0.2 0.2 96.1 51.2 0.4 4.2 
Gulf Cooperation Council 2.0 0.8 93.2 84.9 5.3 3.8 
MERCOSUR 1.5 1.1 86.7 74.6 2.5 11.7 
Other FTAs 10.0 1.7 69.6 77.5 9.1 4.6 
Rest of ACP EPAs 2.3 0.1 98.5 89.3 3.2 7.3 
3. No FTA 55.8 2.3 59.0 0.0* 46.7 3.3 
Major partners 50.3 2.3 59.0 0.0* 38.6 3.3 
Rest of the world 5.5 n.a n.a. n.a. 8.1 n.a. 
Grand total 100.0 1.6 69.9 n.a. 100.0 3.0 
 
 
Source: DG Trade, COMEXT, Taric and MADB. Note: 
a
 The figures include tariff lines for which the EU MFN tariff is zero. 
b
 The sub-country group figures under each 
FTA status heading are the simple average of trade weighted figures by the individual countries in the group. * Some exports from China and Russia are still eligible for 
preferences under the GSP.  This table includes tariff lines HS25-99
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Table 5:  EU imports and exports of agricultural goods, by trading partner and trade agreement status (2009, in %) 
 
Regions and FTA status  EU import regime  
Tariffs faced by EU 
exports 
  
Share of EU 
imports 
Trade weighted EU 
import tariffs 
a 
 
Imports duty-free and 
under preferences 
Preference 
utilisation 
Share of EU 
exports 
Trade weighted  
tariff 
1. FTA in force 21.5 2.0 81.6 83.1 29.1 7.8 
Developing countries 5.8 4.0 80.3 85.2 2.2 0.8 
EFTA and Customs Union 8.8 1.5 76.4 75.3 14.6 5.7 
EPA Caribbean 1.2 1.0 98.0 97.4 0.6 13.6 
Mediterranean FTAs 4.1 1.0 88.7 93.5 7.9 14.8 
Western Balkans 1.6 1.0 94.7 95.5 3.7 4.4 
2. FTA concluded but not yet in force, or 
negotiations on-going or planned 
58.4 6.9 70.2 90.2 26.2 12.5 
Andean 4.6 12.8 65.8 98.6 0.4 9.8 
ASEAN 9.4 2.0 60.9 82.6 4.2 8.5 
Central America 3.0 7.5 71.8 91.7 0.4 10.6 
Gulf Cooperation Council 0.3 0.9 94.0 93.8 5.1 11.6 
MERCOSUR 23.9 10.7 73.5 91.0 1.5 13.5 
Other FTAs 6.7 6.4 80.4 80.0 8.0 15.9 
Rest of ACP EPAs 10.5 0.3 67.5 98.2 6.6 11.8 
3. No FTA 20.1 10.4 50.7 0.0* 44.7 5.2 
Major partners 17.7 11.2 50.7 0.0* 35.8 5.2 
Rest of the world 2.4 4.2   8.9  
Grand total 100.0 6.5 69.0 n.a. 100.0 7.9 
 
Source: DG Trade, COMEXT, and MADB. Note: 
a
 Tariffs displayed are the preferential tariffs . 
b
 The sub-country group figures under each FTA status heading are the simple 
average of trade weighted figures by the individual countries in the group. * Some exports from China are still eligible for preferences under the GSP.  This table covers tariff lines 
HS01-24, except columns 2 and 3 cover Agricultural Products as defined by the WTO. 
  33 
 
2) NON-TARIFF REGULATORY BARRIERS ON GOODS   
 
As tariff barriers are gradually reduced through multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations 
(and autonomous preferences for the poorest countries), non-tariff barriers or measures 
(NTMs)61 are becoming relatively more important obstacles to trade. In this section we 
examine regulatory NTMs that affect trade in goods. The following sections focus on NTMs 
in services and investment, and regulatory restrictions in public procurement markets. NTMs 
in goods trade cover a wide variety of measures, from customs procedures at the border, to 
sanitary & phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade (TBT), domestic 
rules and regulations, export restrictions and export licensing requirements that may adversely 
affect foreign suppliers of goods, etc.   
 
Regulatory measures perform important functions for societies and pursue legitimate public 
policy objectives. Compliance often increases the cost of production of a good or service. But 
it is first and foremost intended to increase the benefits that consumers and citizens derive 
from these goods and services, for example achieving an appropriate level of protection of 
human health and safety, animal and plant life, environmental conservation and safeguarding 
consumers from deceptive practices.  For this reason and unlike tariffs, NTMs cannot simply 
be scrapped. That would lead not only to considerable welfare losses but also a loss in 
consumer confidence that may cause major trade disruptions. However, without calling into 
question the right of countries to establish their own levels of health and safety protection of 
citizens and consumers, NTMs have often been prepared with purely domestic considerations 
in mind, without sufficient account being taken of their impact on international trade or of the 
availability of more trade-friendly solutions. Under the EU’s “Better Regulation” policy, 
legislation and other regulatory measures should be designed in such a way as to minimize 
costs and impact on trade and to maximize the benefits, taking into account proportionate 
risks.  Examination of their impact on trade should include exploring less trade restrictive 
solutions, if any, such as international standards.  In a number of cases, additional cross-
border trade costs of regulation, over and above domestic compliance costs, may be due to 
provisions that discriminate de jure or de facto against foreign producers or which apply 
disproportionate requirements. In those cases, the regulations are considered to be "barriers" 
to trade, giving rise to the expression "non-tariff barriers", in particular if they are unlawful in 
WTO terms, because they do not fulfil a legitimate objective, are not proportional or are 
discriminatory. Such provisions can normally be addressed under the WTO rules. 
 
However, even lawful, proportionate, legitimate and non-discriminatory regulation can give 
rise to additional trade costs for foreign producers, simply because of differences in regulation 
between countries. These differences may be perfectly legitimate and simply the result of 
historical differences in regulatory approaches, differences in income levels, consumer 
preferences and risk perceptions. The welfare gains that they generate by responding to these 
differences should by compared with the costs. They may require foreign suppliers to adapt 
their products to the regulatory requirements of each export market, thereby increasing the 
cost and time of production and bringing a good to the market. As EU companies increasingly 
become part of global supply chains, differences in regulation between the EU and its trading 
partners segment markets, increase the cost of participation in the global economy and reduce 
the competitiveness of local companies in the global market.   
                                                 
61 We prefer the more neutral "measures" rather than "barriers" because most of these measures have been 
designed without much thought being given to their potential impact on trade.  There is no official definition of 
NTMs. 
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Box 6  The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade  
 
The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) refers to mandatory technical 
regulations and voluntary standards that define specific characteristics that a product should 
have, such as its size, shape, design, labelling / marking / packaging, functionality or 
performance, as well as the conformity assessment procedures to check whether a product is 
in compliance with these requirements. The agreement is meant to ensure that such measures 
do not result in discrimination or arbitrary restrictions on international trade, in order to 
minimize the negative impact on trade. The five principles at the core of the TBT Agreement 
are:   
• Transparency - a WTO Member planning to introduce a measure that might have an 
important impact on trade should notify this to the WTO, and take into account comments 
submitted by other countries on the draft legislation.  
• Non-discrimination and national treatment - a measure should not discriminate  between 
different importing Members and should apply in the same way to both imports and 
similar domestic goods 
• Proportionality - a measure should not be more trade restrictive than is necessary to 
achieve the legitimate goal pursued 
• Use of international standards - whenever possible, international standards should be used 
as a basis for technical regulations 
• Equivalence – WTO Members should consider accepting technical regulations of other 
Members as being equivalent to their own. 
 
In the EU, the general approach to technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment 
procedures is based on a legislative method whereby product legislation is restricted to the 
adoption of "essential requirements" necessary to protect public interest such as human health, 
safety or the environment. The detailed technical requirements are usually addressed by 
means of voluntary European standards. This method has made it possible to keep the 
legislative framework flexible and technology-neutral and has given manufacturers and 
importers the possibility to choose different technical solutions to achieve the required level 
of safety. 
 
The same principles underlie the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) WTO Agreement which 
also adds that measures need a scientific justification. Three international standard setting 
bodies62 are specifically recognised in the SPS field, and their standardisation work provides a 
solid reference point towards which WTO members can harmonise their respective laws. At 
the same time, WTO members are free to set their own appropriate level of protection. Where 
it is not supported by an existing standard, such decision must be based on scientific 
justification.  The unnecessary strictness of SPS measures, overly burdensome procedures, 
and insufficient use of trade facilitating tools are the main causes of difficulties in the SPS 
field. Enforcement of the WTO rules goes a long way towards limiting SPS measures to what 
is necessary and justified either by reference to an international standard, or supported by hard 
science. 
 
                                                 
62 The three bodies are: the IPPC - the International Plant Protection Convention (World organisation for plant 
health), the OIE - International Office of Epizootics (World organisation for animal health) and the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission - (World organisation for food safety). 
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In principle, cross-border trade cost of NTMs can be reduced to some extent through mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment procedures or simplification of procedures.  In a 
number of cases, they could even be reduced to zero through full harmonisation between 
trading partners, as has been the case with the Single Market in Europe. The same effect can 
also be achieved when technical regulation is based on international standards. 
 
Apart from the legality of NTMs, there is the issue of their economic and trade impact.  A 
distinction can be made between vertical and horizontal market segmentation as a result of 
NTMs (Baldwin, 2000). Vertical segmentation occurs when an NTM lead to quality 
differences between varieties of the same product. This is beneficial for consumers as it 
enables them to choose the quality level they prefer. Horizontal segmentation occurs when 
regulation separates markets for one and the same quality of a product. That has no benefits 
for consumers and just enables producers and suppliers to practise price-discrimination 
between markets.  
 
Unlike tariffs on goods, for which precise values are available, there is no direct measure of 
the trade cost of NTMs. Trade costs can only be estimated, either by using statistical 
techniques that estimate the tariff cost equivalent of NTMs or by means of direct estimates 
based on firm surveys. There are several estimation methods available, using econometric 
techniques and trade restrictiveness indexes, and usually producing quite different outcomes. 
Tables 6 and 7 present some trade cost estimates of NTMs from two studies commissioned by 
DG TRADE. The first covers NTMs in the context of EU-US trade.  These estimates are 
based on a combination of firm-level surveys and statistical techniques.  The second study 
relates to trade between the EU and Japan.  It includes NTM estimates obtained directly from 
firm level surveys. Both studies cover a limited number of sectors only. The results should not 
be taken at face value and should be interpreted with caution.  They are just an indication of 
an order of magnitude, not a precise estimate comparable to the reliability of a tariff figure 
however.  Firms may not always have a clear view on the additional trade costs that NTM 
entail.  Moreover, the estimation methods used inevitably induce a degree of uncertainty in 
the results. 
 
Table 6:  Trade costs of NTMs in the US and the EU (in % tariff equivalent) 
Sector 
 
NTM costs  
in the EU 
NTM costs  
in the US 
Chemicals 23.9 21.0 
Pharmaceuticals 15.3 9.5 
Cosmetics 34.6 32.4 
Electronics 6.5 6.5 
Office & communications equipment 19.1 22.9 
Automotive 25.5 26.8 
Aerospace 18.8 19.1 
Food & Beverages 56.8 73.3 
Metals 11.9 17.0 
Textiles & clothing 19.2 16.7 
Wood & paper products 11.3 7.7 
Source:  Ecorys (2009) "Non-Tariff Measures in EU-US Trade and Investment – An Economic Analysis" 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/analysis/chief-economist/ 
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These studies show that the estimated trade costs of NTMs are usually considerably higher 
than the corresponding import tariffs for these goods, both for the EU and for its trading 
partners. In most cases NTMs are a bigger obstacle to trade than import tariffs. The 
consistency of this finding across sectors and countries, and across several other studies, 
indicates that more attention should be paid to reducing NTMs using a variety of regulatory 
approaches.   
 
Table 7:  Trade costs of NTMs for EU exports to Japan (in % tariff equivalent) 
Sectors 
Trade cost estimate  
(% tariff equivalent) 
Food and beverages 25.0 
Chemicals & pharmaceuticals 22.0 
Electrical machinery 11.6 
Motor vehicles 10.0 
Transport equipment 45.0 
Metals and metal products 21.3 
Wood and paper products 15.4 
Other machinery 30.0 
Personal, cultural, other services 6.5 
 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics (2010), "The barriers to trade and investment between the EU and Japan", 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/analysis/chief-economist/ 
 
 
What policy instruments are available to reduce these trade costs of NTMs? Unlike tariffs, the 
laws and regulations that result in NTMs, which normally are the outcome of a democratic 
legislative process, cannot simply be removed. Removing the regulation would take away the 
consumer benefits of the regulation and run counter to democratic principles. One way to 
address NTMs is to align regulations between countries that have the political will and 
mandate for doing so, is to make use of international standards where available Experience 
has shown that mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures is facilitated when 
both parties regulatory systems are based on international standards.  
 
Harmonisation and convergence towards the standard of a large trading partner may work for 
smaller economies that have less to gain from setting their own standards, for instance 
between the EU and its neighbours. Between large economies, however, harmonisation might 
prove more difficult. When the EU seeks a reduction in regulatory barriers with its major 
trading partners, the reference to common third party or international standards may be a 
better way forward. Several industry sectors have moved in that direction, for instance 
electronics and automobile. In the agri-food sector, where there are internationally recognised 
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standards for most products, the EU objective is to achieve full alignment with these 
standards (harmonisation as defined by the WTO SPS Agreement)63.  
 
When harmonisation or recognition of equivalence of standards or regulations is not an 
option, mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures still remains a possibility. 
The trade costs of regulation are often unnecessarily high because of duplications in 
procedures, laboratory testing requirements and other compliance procedures, etc. Finally, 
many NTMs concern domestic regulatory issues other than product-specific technical 
regulations or standards that are not necessarily directly related to trade, such as domestic 
industrial policies and tax issues for instance. For this reason, tackling them in a trade 
agreement is more difficult. A more comprehensive regulatory partnership approach may be 
required to address the wide range of regulatory issues that these NTMs cover. International 
agreements can address some of them and minimize the trade costs of these regulatory 
differences, but they cannot usually be reduced to zero. 
 
As the EU is one of the largest global markets, companies that adopt EU regulatory standards 
benefit from strong economies of scale and the regulatory leadership role played by EU 
standards in world markets. However, outside the EU neighbourhood and given the growing 
economic power of EMEs, that regulatory leadership position should not be taken for granted, 
especially in products and areas where other major EU partners have different regulatory 
approaches and where EMEs are rapidly gaining prominence. In industrial sectors, regulatory 
partnerships in specific sectors with strategic trading partners that share the EU's regulatory 
objectives will become more important.  
 
In conclusion, NTMs on goods can create higher trade costs than do tariffs on goods. At the 
same time, they are also more difficult to reduce and, unlike tariffs, cannot just be abolished. 
NTM trade cost reductions potentially offer substantial benefits, but these benefits are not 
easy to achieve. Some regulatory differences between countries are unavoidable, but their 
impact should be reduced, whenever possible and appropriate, by means of regulatory 
convergence and harmonisation.  
 
 
                                                 
63 The EU needs to actively contribute to the work of international standard setting bodies like those for the 
agrifood sector. The EU’s own regulatory practice is setting an important example when building on solid 
science and using a result-oriented approach. 
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3) BARRIERS TO TRADE IN SERVICES 
 
 
Services represent 70% of world output but only about one fifth of world trade. The low 
proportion of services in total trade is partly a result of natural barriers since some services are 
by definition non-tradable and have to be produced and consumed where the client is, for 
example, taxi services.64 Falling transport costs and most of all rapidly declining costs for 
digital services delivery have boosted trade in services. But trade barriers continue to play a 
major role. Like regulatory barriers in goods, barriers to trade in services are generally by an 
order of magnitude higher than import tariffs for goods. 
 
Given the EU's high level of economic development, services account for about 30% of EU 
exports (2009). Generally, services play a particularly important role in trade between 
developed economies: EU services exports to the United States represent 36% of all EU 
exports to the US but EU services exports to China represent only 18% of all EU exports to 
that country. The EU's top-five trading partners (United States, Switzerland, Russia, China 
and Japan) collectively account for half of all extra-EU commercial services exports.  
 
The EU is the world's "market leader" in global services trade, accounting for 27% of global 
exports and 25% of global imports in 2009, even if its market share has eroded slightly 
between 2004 and 2009. Services are thus an area of international trade where the EU's 
industry is highly competitive, but where trade barriers continue to prevent it from reaping the 
full benefits of its strong competitiveness. It also is noteworthy that services exports have 
been less affected by the 2008-2009 financial crisis than goods exports. On the import side, 
the EU's opening up of its own services import markets is important for its competitiveness, 
including for the manufacturing sector that is a major consumer of transport, financial and 
business services inputs. Approximately 75% of services trade relates to intermediate 
services65 and has thus a direct bearing on downstream industries' competitiveness.  
 
Statistics on trade in services are generally less comprehensive and robust than for goods 
trade, not only because data collection systems are less developed in some countries but also 
because a substantial proportion of services are supplied via foreign direct investment (e.g. 
local branch offices, known as mode 3 in WTO parlance). 
 
Virtually all services trade barriers are non-tariff barriers; that is, they include a wide-range of 
regulatory measures whose trade impact is often difficult to quantify and compare across 
sectors and countries. The WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) classifies 
these barriers in three types: market access barriers (at-the-border barriers that prevent entry 
into a national market), national treatment barriers (that discriminate between domestic and 
foreign services providers) and domestic regulation barriers (that apply to all providers but 
create de facto additional hurdles for foreign providers).  
 
 
 
                                                 
64 The WTO distinguishes between four modes of services trade, which are also used in bilateral trade 
negotiations: mode 1 – cross-border supply; mode 2 – consumption abroad (e.g. tourism); mode 3 – foreign 
establishment; and mode 4 – Presence of natural persons in recipient country (temporary movement of labour). 
65 Miroudot, S./ Lanz, R./ Ragoussis, A: "Trade in intermediate goods and services", OECD 2009 
TAD/TC/WP(2009)1 
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Table 8  EU Imports and Exports - Commercial services (2008) 
 
Rank Exports to Mio euro Billion euro Rank Imports from Mio euro
1 United States 132,567 1 United States 130,760
2 Switzerland 66,805 2 Switzerland 46,953
3 Russia 20,837 3 China 14,999
4 China 19,863 4 Japan 14,443
5 Japan 19,198 5 Russia 13,485
6 Norway 18,654 6 Turkey 12,554
7 Australia 12,293 7 Norway 12,019
8 Singapore 11,901 8 Canada 9,550
9 Canada 11,516 9 Singapore 8,600
10 Brazil 9,091 10 Hong Kong 7,927
11 Hong Kong 8,860 11 India 7,867
12 India 8,366 12 Egypt 6,533
13 South Korea 7,843 13 Australia 6,331
14 Turkey 6,413 14 Brazil 6,059
15 South Africa 6,086 15 Croatia 5,249
16 Mexico 4,747 16 Thailand 4,814
17 Nigeria 4,497 17 South Korea 4,366
18 Taiwan 3,777 18 South Africa 4,286
19 Israel 3,730 19 Morocco 4,198
20 Egypt 3,381 20 Mexico 3,244
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Table 9  EU share in services imports of major trading partners  
 
  2009 
    
Hong Kong 24% 
China 16% 
Canada 19% 
Brazil 28% 
India 16% 
Japan 16% 
Russia 42% 
US 50% 
 
Source:  Eurostat, WTO 
 
 
Contrary to trade in goods, where import tariffs provide a readily observable measure of 
restrictions to trade, the aggregate impact of regulatory barriers restricting services trade must 
be estimated indirectly. Given the challenging data environment and the availability of several 
different estimation methods, services barrier estimates necessarily involve a degree of 
statistical variation. However, recent research commissioned by the European Commission 
(DG TRADE), the OECD and the World Bank, based on a variety of approaches, consistently 
concludes that services barriers are by an order of magnitude higher than the tariff barriers 
prevailing in most manufactured goods markets. 
 
Table 10 presents services barrier estimates66 using one particular method, the gravity 
approach67. This approach generates estimates of the tariff equivalents of market access and 
                                                 
66 Based on cross-section gravity regressions covering 82 countries 
67 In gravity models, the volume of trade between two countries is determined by the size of their respective 
economies (population, GDP per capita) and the distance between them.  Other variables can be added to 
this simple model, for instance language differences, past colonial links, etc.  The trade volume predicted by 
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regulatory barriers to services trade. This provides an example of the level of barriers found in 
different services sectors. 
 
Table 10  Estimated tariff equivalents of services barriers (in %)   
  Telecom Constr Trade Transport Finance 
Business 
services Other  
Developed Countries 24 42 31 17 34 24 26 
Asia  33 25 17 8 32 15 17 
Eu25 22 35 30 18 32 22 27 
USA  29 73 48 14 41 34 7 
Developing countries 50 80 47 27 57 50 34 
Total mean 35 58 38 21 44 35 29 
Max 119 119 95 53 103 101 54 
Source: DG TRADE/ CEPII 
 
Another approach is taken by the OECD's Service Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) 
project, an ambitious attempt to compare services trade barriers across countries and sectors.  
This approach generates an index of the level of trade restrictiveness, not a tariff equivalent. 
At this stage, it covers four sectors (professional services, computer services, 
telecommunications services and construction services) in the thirty OECD countries. The EU 
member states are assessed individually, thus enabling a comparison of levels of openness 
both between EU and non-EU countries as well as among EU member states themselves. The 
four sectors included in the pilot investigation provide only partial coverage of total services 
trade.  They include a range of services characteristics such as regulation intensity and 
principal modes of trade (e.g. cross-border trade (mode 1) versus trade by foreign 
establishment (mode 3). The pattern emerging from the available sector STRIs is that the 
services trade barriers prevailing in EU Member States are generally in the same range as 
those in non-EU OECD countries, but there are large variations between individual EU 
countries. The exception is telecoms, where non-EU countries are clearly more restrictive.  
 
Approximately 75% of services trade concerns the supply of intermediate services to almost 
every sector in the economy.68 For example, business services providers could help industry 
customers comply with government regulation and thus lower entry costs in foreign markets; 
telecommunication services help firms create data links between dispersed production sites; 
retail services help firms reach their customers, etc. Manufactured goods thus embody a 
substantial amount of services inputs. Consequently, increased services trade opening could 
enhance the competitiveness of manufacturing firms, leading to overall welfare gains.  Recent 
research indicates that services trade barriers need to fall below a critical level before trade 
takes off.69 Unless natural barriers are prohibitive, taking services opening across this critical 
threshold is therefore a key factor for creating a real impact from services trade agreements. 
 
Significant progress has already been achieved in facilitating EU internal trade in services, for 
instance by means of initiatives such as the EU Services Directive and the E-Commerce 
Directive.  This has increased the value of our international commitments, notably as firms 
established in one Member State are now in a position to provide services across the EU for a 
number of key services sectors.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the gravity model is taken as a benchmark.  The role that regulatory barriers play in deviations from that 
predicted volume can then be estimated. 
68 Miroudot et al, op. sit. 
69 Nordas, H.: "Trade in goods and services: Two sides of the same coin?", in: Economic Modelling (2009) 
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International trade negotiations in the services sectors have so far mainly focused on 
(partially) consolidating the existing barriers ("binding water"), rather than achieving new 
market access. Further development of the EU Internal Market in services should facilitate 
more effective services trade opening, including on regulatory aspects, both at multilateral 
and bilateral levels. Deeper services market access in bilateral Free Trade Agreements will 
require a certain degree of approximation of rules and regulatory systems between the 
partners. Services trade negotiations with major trading partners may require some flexibility 
from the EU side as well. To the extent that market access, national treatment and regulatory 
barriers in services are in practice non-discriminatory, third parties are able to free ride on 
bilateral services opening. That constitutes a disincentive for trading partners to grant further 
opening. Important potential gains have thus remained untapped in many negotiations.  
However, the costs of free-riding and dissipated benefits should be compared with the 
benefits for domestic services providers from granting further bilateral opening and tackling 
regulatory barriers. For example, Korea's commitment to adopt the liability regime provided 
for by the EU E-Commerce Directive, benefits both EU and Korean online companies. 
 
The degree of opening of services trade in a trade agreement is defined through schedules that 
contain lists of commitments and/or reservations. These schedules generally take the form of 
either a "bottom-up" positive list or a "top-down" negative list. A negative list thus provides 
for the comprehensive liberalisation of trade for all service sectors except those otherwise 
specified in a list of reservations.  A positive list is based on the voluntary inclusion of a 
designated number of sectors, indicating precisely what type of access and what type of 
treatment applies in each sector and for each mode of supply. Negative lists normally capture 
the status quo and focus negotiations on potential new trade liberalisation, while also 
capturing and locking in future trade liberalisation, unless otherwise specified in the 
agreement. A positive list liberalises a designated set of sectors, indicating precisely what 
type of access and what type of treatment applies in each sector and for each mode of supply, 
retaining greater policy space by ensuring that as new sectors emerge, they stand outside any 
market opening framework unless and until explicitly brought into it.  
These two approaches differ in the degree of transparency.  Negative lists describe all 
discriminatory regulation that applies to any sector while positive lists only list the restrictions 
applicable to those sectors which are liberalised.  They provide no information regarding the 
situation of those sectors which are not included, nor the scope of opening in these sectors.  
Negative lists generally reflect at least the current autonomous state of opening and capture 
future market opening. Likewise, they generally liberalise, unless this is specifically carved 
out, trade in services inexistent at the time of the agreement and for which, therefore, no 
restrictions of treatment were listed in the agreement. 
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4) INVESTMENT BARRIERS 
 
Investment presents itself as another new frontier for the common commercial policy. The 
Lisbon Treaty provides for the Union to contribute to the progressive abolition of restrictions 
on foreign direct investment. The Treaty grants the Union exclusive competence to that effect. 
This enhances the EU's ability to speak and act on investment issues on the global scene and 
responds to the increasing need of EU and foreign investors for a more integrated, open, 
transparent and predictable investment environment.  
 
There are as yet no multilateral investment rules and disciplines, despite several attempts in 
that direction in the WTO and the OECD.  Consequently, cross-border investment rules can 
be freely negotiated in bilateral agreements between countries, in case a party is not satisfied 
with local rules and restrictions in a partner country where it intends to invest. Until the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Member States could conclude Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs) with third countries to increase market access and protect their investments. With a 
total of almost 1200 agreements, Member States account for almost half of the investment 
agreements currently in force around the world. These BITs are generally related to the 
treatment of investors “post-entry” only, for example commitments against unfair or 
discriminatory treatment or a guarantee of prompt, adequate and effective compensation in 
case of expropriation. They do not include market access commitments. The EU has started 
filling that gap through multilateral and bilateral trade agreements that include provisions for 
investment market access70. The Commission recently adopted a Communication that 
explains how it intends to take up its new Lisbon investment policy responsibilities and 
include these in new trade agreements or in separate investment agreements. 
 
Some statistics 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is generally considered to include any foreign investment that 
establishes lasting and direct links between the investor and the company to which capital is 
made available71. The benefits of inward FDI, both into the EU and other countries, are well-
established. FDI creates jobs, optimises resource allocation, transfers technology and skills, 
and increases competition. Through FDI, companies build the global supply chains that are 
part of the modern international economy. Investment is often perceived as a substitute for 
trade: building a factory is seen as a substitute for trading these products from the home 
country. In today's world of global production chains however, that is less and less true. 
Around half of world trade today takes place between affiliates of multinational enterprises 
that trade intermediate goods and services. Investment is more often a complement to trade: 
more investment brings more trade.  
                                                 
70 At the multilateral level, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provides for a framework for 
undertaking commitments on the supply of services through a commercial presence (defined as "mode 3" by 
GATS Article I). At the bilateral level, the Union has concluded negotiations with Korea on a Free Trade 
Agreement, which includes provisions on market access for investors and establishments. 
71 UNCTAD defines FDI as “an investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of 
the economy of the investor. Further, in cases of FDI, the investor´s purpose is to gain an effective voice in 
the management of the enterprise. […] Some degree of equity ownership is almost always considered to be 
associated with an effective voice in the management of an enterprise; […]  a threshold of 10 per cent of 
equity ownership [is suggested] to qualify an investor as a foreign direct investor”. 
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Most of the empirical evidence72 at the firm level finds that EU outward FDI may have a 
negative short-term impact but a positive medium and long term impact on employment in the 
investing firm. Hijzen, Jean and Mayer (2009) find that French manufacturing firms which 
open foreign subsidiaries in developed countries on average experience a 25% higher 
employment after 3 years compared to similar firms who do not invest abroad.  Lipsey et al. 
(2007) found that skilled EU workers are challenged by the establishment of a foreign affiliate 
in another developed country while unskilled workers are challenged by establishments in 
developing countries. Positive or neutral effects inside the firm may be offset by a negative 
effect in other firms in the same sector.  At the firm level the findings suggest that the 
negative impact of moving part of the supply chain abroad is more than offset by the positive 
scale effect due to productivity gains.  
Over the last two decades, the global economy has witnessed a remarkable expansion in 
foreign direct investment (FDI), mainly driven by a significant increase of the share of 
emerging economies. The EU remains one of the largest recipients of global FDI inflows, 
after the US (see table 11 and figure 12). After reaching an historical peak in 2007, FDI 
inflows recorded a substantial fall when the 2008-09 economic crisis hit all major economies. 
In 2008, EU-27 FDI inflows fell by 40% to a total of USD 503 billion. The major part of the 
EU inflows is accounted for by services sectors, in particular the financial sector. Cross-
border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) – the main mode of FDI entry and the principal 
drivers of the FDI boom during the early 00's - decreased by almost 90% in 2009 compared to 
the peak of 900 billion US$ in 2007, especially in the financial sector (UNCTAD 2009). 
 
Table 11  Global FDI inflows (in millions of Euro) 
 
 
1995 
 
2000 
 
2005 
 
2008 
 
World 260.846 1.495.967 782.356 1.154.034 
Developed economies 169.038 1.210.267 492.768 654.242 
Europe 104.465 765.896 406.804 352.420 
European Union 100.922 737.037 400.643 342.299 
North America 52.008 412.302 104.867 245.325 
United States 44.932 339.982 84.216 214.925 
Other developed countries 12.566 32.069 -18.902 56.496 
Developing economies 88.664 278.123 264.712 422.038 
Africa 4.324 10.543 30.723 59.592 
Latin America 22.563 106.482 61.977 98.162 
Brazil 3.368 35.491 12.110 30.635 
Chile 2.260 5.262 5.614 11.413 
Mexico 7.283 19.520 17.621 14.924 
Asia and Oceania 61.777 161.099 172.011 264.284 
China 28.685 44.083 58.200 73.642 
Hong Kong 4.750 67.046 27.022 42.836 
Korea 971 9.748 5.671 5.169 
Taiwan 1.192 5.336 1.306 3.693 
India 1.644 3.882 6.114 28.253 
Singapore 8.819 17.848 11.554 15.450 
Thailand 1.583 3.626 6.469 6.861 
South-East Europe and the CIS 3.144 7.576 24.876 77.754 
Source:  UNCTAD (2009) 
Note:  EU flows include intra-EU flows 
 
                                                 
72 Copenhagen Economics (2009)" Impact of EU outward investment on the EU economy", report for the 
European Commission (DG TRADE), available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/analysis/chief-economist/ 
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In 2008, the US still retained its position as the largest FDI recipient, both among developed 
countries and worldwide. The increase (from 2007 to 2008) in FDI inflows towards the US 
(17% or USD 316 billion) is mostly due to a rise in equity capital inflows - primarily in 
manufacturing and finance sectors. While FDI stocks and flows are today still heavily 
concentrated among industrialised countries, emerging market economies have become 
increasingly active as investors - and as recipients of investment.  
 
The upsurge of investment activities by Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) based in emerging 
market economies has triggered concerns in developed countries that these new actors may be 
pursuing political rather than just economic aims. Some countries took measures to improve 
investment transparency; while others adopted legislation aiming at authorising the review of 
foreign investment, sometimes using national security reasons. 
 
 
Figure 12  Origin and destination of EU foreign direct investment inflows and outflows 
 
 
Source: European Commission - DG TRADE 
Note: EU flows exclude intra-EU flows 
 
 
According to UNCTAD73 (2008) “110 new FDI-related measures were introduced by a total 
of 55 countries. Of these, 85 measures were more favourable to FDI. Compared to the 
previous year, the percentage of less favourable measures for FDI has remained unchanged 
and stands at 23 per cent”.  
 
Measuring investment restrictiveness:  
 
Barriers to foreign investment take the form of regulatory restrictions. The OECD classifies 
these in to three broad categories: 
 
                                                 
73 Survey of changes to National Laws and Regulations related to FDI 
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• Restrictions on foreign ownership of equity capital  
• Mandatory screening and approval procedures increasing the cost of entry.  
• Operational restrictions: for example limits on foreign nationals working in affiliates, or 
nationality and residence requirements for members of the board of directors, input 
restrictions and discriminatory government regulations, or restrictions on the repatriation 
of profits. 
 
Equity limitations and screening are related to rights of establishment, whereas the others are 
related to national treatment of established firms. Note that this classification does not cover 
risks of expropriation and compensation. These risks are assumed to be negligible in OECD 
countries with well-established legal and judicial systems. In that logic, BITs make sense only 
for countries that are not perceived to provide adequate legal and judicial protection of foreign 
investors. By contrast, agreements that seek to relax market access restrictions are useful for 
all countries. 
 
Most attempts to measure the FDI restrictiveness of countries are based on a scoring approach 
of these types of restrictions74. The OECD FDI restrictiveness indicators weight different 
barriers (equity, screening, and other restrictions) to FDI according to their perceived 
significance. The score ranges between 0 (unrestricted) and 1 (prohibited). They cover nine 
sectors of which seven are services industries, where the bulk of FDI restrictions are generally 
found. The information is aggregated into a single measure for the economy as a whole. The 
figure below presents OECD FDI regulatory restrictiveness indicators by type of restrictions.   
 
Figure 13 presents a summary. Overall FDI restrictions are low in most of the developed 
countries. However, the overall level of barriers masks wide differences between countries 
and across sectors. The most open economies are in Europe, though some potentially 
restrictive measures on FDI still remain that can prevent investment from entering the EU 
market and/or increase the cost of FDI. Since the late 1980s, intra-EU FDI flows are almost 
completely unrestricted. Nonetheless, some important differences in barriers to FDI among 
EU member states remain. The US is below the OECD mean and Japan is above the OECD 
mean.  Similar barriers remain in other OECD economies, and in emerging market 
economies.  The high level of barriers to investment in India and China stands out. 
 
The bulk of restrictions are found in services sectors. FDI inflows into manufacturing are 
almost completely free, apart from economy-wide restrictions such as notification or 
screening requirements. Within services industries, construction, hotels and restaurants are on 
average relatively unrestricted. By contrast, electricity, transport, telecoms, finance and media 
are the most constrained industries. Electricity has the highest score. However, this high score 
for electricity results more from public ownership than explicitly discriminatory barriers 
against foreign investment. Again, these average patterns hide cross-country differences in the 
magnitude of the barriers in services. The fall in FDI barriers has been particularly significant 
in the telecoms and air transport sectors, which were almost completely closed in the early 
1980s.  
                                                 
74  Other measures of the FDI barriers exist: the UNCTAD inward FDI index but it was only released for 
2001.Tha World Bank also provides a database about the institutional obstacles for doing business (1997) 
but it consists of private sector survey with all the caveats that may rise from such a survey approach. 
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Figure 13  FDI restrictiveness in the world 
 
Source: OECD (2007), International Investment Perspectives: Freedom of Investment in a changing World, Paris 
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5) PUBLIC PROCUREMENT MARKETS 
Public procurement markets are significant in size; in the EU they were estimated at more 
than € 2 trillion in 2007 or about 16% of GDP while in the US they passed the € 1 trillion 
mark (or 11% of GDP)75. No data are yet available for 2008 and 2009 but the importance of 
these markets is likely to have temporarily increased in many countries, on the back of the 
unprecedented boost in public spending across the world to stabilise the economy in the wake 
of the global crisis of 200976.  
 
For some types of goods and services (such as pharmaceutical products, medical equipment, 
railway and urban transport equipment, electrical machinery, environmental services…) 
purchases by public entities may be dominant and therefore their procurement practices can 
crucially determine market access. In reality such practices are often not (primarily) guided by 
cost or technical considerations but rather by other policy goals such as, the promotion of 
local employment and/or companies or the development of "home" technologies. However, 
the explicit clauses or implicit practices to favour domestic suppliers that are often used for 
such purposes generally result in welfare-reducing outcomes similar to those associated with 
other protectionist instruments77. Yet, unlike more "traditional" barriers to foreign interests, 
the international rules governing public procurement leave ample room for such practices, as 
became very clear during the recent global crisis.  
 
The Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) has provided the main legal framework at 
WTO level since 1996. It establishes a set of rights and obligations (including a schedule of 
commitments regarding the coverage of purchases, contracting authorities, values of 
contracts) for public procurement laws, regulations, and procedures founded on the WTO 
principles of transparency and non-discrimination. This plurilateral agreement binds 14 WTO 
members, including the EU's main trading partners78. Recently, the accession process has 
been completed for Chinese Taipe and the geographical coverage of the agreement is due to 
expand further in future with recent applications from China and Jordan. EU neighbours such 
as the Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia are also seeking accession while India has 
become an observer along with some 23 other countries. The EU strongly supports accession 
of other WTO members to the GPA with the long-term objective to turn it into a multilateral 
Agreement. 
 
However, the GPA does not automatically apply to all government procurement of the 
Parties. GPA provisions only cover public procurement above a minimum threshold and do 
                                                 
75  An OECD study estimated the value of worldwide government procurement at 82% of the value of world 
merchandise and services trade in 1998, see D. Audet, "Government Procurement: A synthesis report", 
OECD Journal on Budgeting, 2 (3), 2002.   
76  The OECD estimated that fiscal packages introduced as a direct response to the crisis over the period 2008-
2010 amounted to about 3.5% of the OECD GDP in 2008. In non-OECD China the size of the fiscal 
stimulus package is thought to have been equivalent to as much as 19% of GDP. These figures are drawn 
from a consistent approach to the definition of fiscal packages in the different economies and are based on 
data from March 2009, see OECD, "Policy Responses to the Economic Crisis: Investing in Innovation for 
Long-term Growth, 2009.  
77   The exact effect on welfare depends on a variety of factor notably the size of government purchases to 
domestic supply, market structures, long-run industry supply, etc. For a more details see for example S. 
Evenett, and B. Hoekman, "Government Procurement: Market Access, Transparency and Multilateral Trade 
Rules", World Bank Research Working Paper no. 3195, 2004.  
78   The EU is one single Party to the Agreement. The others are Canada, Hong-Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan, 
Korea, Liechtenstein, Norway, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United States. 
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not apply to all procurement entities in all countries79. The coverage of the agreement for each 
Party is specified in the GPA Annexes that identify the central and sub-central government 
entities as well as public utilities that are committed to complying with the market access 
rules in their procurement activities. The extent and depth of the legal commitments varies 
considerably among the Parties, which continue to impose (more or less) important 
restrictions on market access, including wide ranging exemptions for certain sectors and types 
of expenditures80. In general, the EU, Norway, Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Singapore have 
undertaken the most far-reaching legal commitments while the others (including large 
economies such as the US, Japan and Canada) have failed to meet the EU requests for similar 
coverage and held back on market opening, especially at sub-central level. While the EU had 
to adjust its final commitments in light of the degree of market opening of the other Parties, 
they nevertheless continue to be amongst the most comprehensive. 
 
 
Figure 14  Evolution of above GPA threshold public procurement in the EU 
 
Source: WTO 
 
 
In the EU, the size of the public procurement market above GPA thresholds81 (i.e. public 
procurement that could potentially be bound by market openness commitments) has been 
increasing over time. In 2007 the total amount of purchases of goods and services (incl. 
construction services) by public authorities and utilities across the EU27 amounted to €2088 
billion, €370 billion of which (17.5% of total) was above the threshold for the application of 
GPA commitments82. Although to some extent the growth in the size of public procurement 
markets in the EU is a reflection of the 2004 enlargement, it nevertheless reveals rising levels 
                                                 
79  Thresholds differ depending on the type procurement (goods and services) and types of procuring entities 
making the purchase. Thresholds are set in SDR, terms of the IMF's accounting unit of Special Drawing 
Rights. Each GPA Party specified in its Annexes the minimum threshold values above which procurement is 
covered by the Agreement. For instance, the EU thresholds for the procurement of goods and general 
services are the following: for central government entities 130 000 SDR, for sub-central government entities 
200 000 SDR, for other entities 400 000 SDR. The threshold for construction services is 5 000 000 SDR.  
80  For example, all defence procurement is excluded from the GPA. 
81 Hence, published in the EU Official Journal TED (Tenders Electronic Daily), the online public procurement 
portal of the EU at http://ted.europa.eu. 
82  In 2009, the EU submitted a very comprehensive 2007 GPA statistics report and notified to the WTO its 
earlier statistical reports (period 1996-2006). The EU is one of the few parties whose reports cover all 
administrative levels (central, local and regional, bodies governed by public law, utilities) and provides 
detail on all contracts covered by the GPA. 
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of EU openness in this regard, as the share of "above GPA threshold" public procurement in 
GDP rose from 1.6% in 1996 to 3% in 2007, as shown in figure 14.  
 
However, not all "above threshold" public procurement is open to foreign bidders, as 
indicated before. Some segments (by type of contracting authority and by type of purchase) 
are excluded from GPA commitments. The total amount of public procurement that is 
effectively open (contestable) to foreign bidders can thus be computed as the public 
procurement above the minimum threshold for the application of GPA rules minus the 
exclusions from these rules negotiated by each country. Overall, in the case of the EU it is 
estimated that these restrictions reduce the amount of public procurement that is contestable 
by foreign suppliers to €312 billion (equivalent to around 2.5% of EU GDP). For example, 
according to the tenders published in the EU Official Journal in 2007, €30 billion of EU 
government procurement were purchases by contracting entities that are excluded from the 
EU GPA commitments, namely entities operating in the railway services, oil and gas 
extraction, transport and distribution. Works concessions, which are also excluded from EU 
GPA commitments, amounted to €21-22 billion in 2007.  
 
Table 12  Access to public procurement markets (2007) 
  
 EU US Japan Canada Korea 
Total PP market 
(% of GDP)   
€ 2088 bn 
(16%) 
€1077 bn 
(11%) 
€ 565 bn 
(18%) 
€ 225 bn 
(22%) 
€ 106 bn 
(14%)  
Total PP above GPA 
threshold 
(% of GDP)   
€ 370 bn 
(3%) 
€ 279 bn 
(3%) 
€ 96 bn 
(3%) 
€ 59 bn 
(6%) 
€25 bn 
(3%) 
PP not offered to GPA 
(% of GDP)   
€ 58 bn  
(0.5%) 
€ 245 bn 
(2.5%) 
€ 74 bn 
 (2.5%) 
€ 57 bn  
(5.5 %) 
€ 10 bn  
(1.0%) 
PP offered to GPA 
(% of GDP)   
(% of total PP market) 
(% of above threshold 
PP market ) 
€ 312 bn 
(2.5%) 
(15%) 
(84%) 
€ 34 bn 
(0.5%) 
(3.2%) 
(12%) 
€ 22 bn 
(0.5%) 
(4%) 
(23%) 
€ 2 bn 
(0.5%) 
(1%) 
(3%) 
€ 15 bn 
(2%) 
(14%) 
(60%) 
Source: EU Commission - DG Markt   
 
 
Cross-country comparisons, which are crucial for a thorough assessment of openness, are 
complicated by differences in terms of the comprehensiveness of the data disclosed83. Table 
13 compares market size and market access in the five largest parties to the GPA.. While the 
EU government procurement market is the largest in absolute terms, the size of these markets 
relative to GDP is broadly similar in the EU, Japan, and Korea (between 15% and 18% of 
GDP). The US market is the smallest relative to the economy (worth only 11% of GDP) and 
around half that of Canada, where public procurement makes up the largest share of output 
(22%). However, the EU procurement market is the most open to foreign suppliers. The 
public procurement that is legally open (contestable) to bidders from other GPA parties is 
equivalent to 15% of the total EU procurement market (around 2.5% of GDP), compared to 
                                                 
83  There are problems regarding the coverage of the data; for example at sub-central level (e.g. US) or with 
public undertakings (e.g. Japan, US). Canada submitted its first statistical reports in 2008.  
  50 
14% in Korea, 4% in Japan and 3% in the US84. In Canada, the negotiated exclusions from 
GPA commitments cancel out practically all access to the local public procurement markets 
(only 1% would remain open)85. 
      
In addition, the EU has included in its GPA commitments a series of derogations targeting 
specific countries (notably the four main GPA parties analysed above).  They limit access to 
procurement by local authorities and services. Even in case such derogations would result in 
market access restrictions for these countries, the EU public procurement markets still remain 
more open to foreign suppliers than the markets of the US, Japan, Canada and South Korea, 
as can be seen in Table 12. 
 
Table 13  Comparative openness of public procurement markets to EU firms 
 
"Direct" access to above-threshold PP US Japan Canada Korea 
  Access of GPA partner's firms to EU PP  (% of above 
threshold PP market )  
27% 70% 4.3% 77% 
  Access of EU firms to GPA Partner's PP (% of above 
threshold PP market )  
12% 23% 3% 50% 
Source: EU Commission - DG Markt   
 
 
Finally, a full assessment of openness in EU public procurement markets requires going 
beyond the analysis of the legal framework to look at measures of effective market access (i.e. 
the share of public procurement that is actually awarded to foreign companies). For the first 
time, the EU has concluded such an analysis based on the examination of more than 100.000 
public procurement contracts published in TED in 2007. It revealed that around 14% of such 
contracts (worth € 11-12 billions) were awarded to foreign firms86. The latter also include 
subsidiaries of foreign firms, which in the EU (unlike in other jurisdictions) are considered to 
be domestic firms and therefore face no restrictions in bidding for public tenders. 
 
The GPA has only been in place since 1996 but its review has already been underway for 
some years, with the aim to make it more attractive for other WTO members to join (in 
particular emerging and developing countries).. In December 2006, negotiators reached an 
understanding on a significant revision of the agreement text to make it more "user friendly". 
The provisions were also updated to take into account new developments in procurement 
                                                 
84 A thorough international comparison should also take into account the implications of the different 
interpretation of the law in the various jurisdictions. For instance, in some other jurisdictions such as the US, 
the derogations to the agreement constitute outright bans to awarding contracts to foreign firms while in 
others these constitute a right to ban access. In addition, the interpretation of what is a "domestic bidder" 
may also differ. For example, the EU rules out any discrimination (for public procurement purposes) on the 
basis of national origin of the capital. Thus, the duly established subsidiary of, say, a company based in 
another jurisdiction (including those for which the EU has not yet concluded an agreement) is treated as a 
EU company and is therefore entitled to bid for any procurement contracts. However, this is not the case 
elsewhere.   
85  These restrictions can be traced to different types of procuring authorities and types of goods. In the US and 
particularly in Canada the main driving factor is the reduced market access in sub-federal (state and local) 
government procurement, while in Japan it is to a large extent due to the exclusion of procurement by local 
public corporations and by the national health system.   
86  More than 100.000 public procurement contracts and lots published in TED in 2007 have been reviewed. 
The bulk of these contracts have been awarded to US firms (€8-9 billion), followed by with Swiss, Canadian 
and Japanese firms which obtained  around  €1 billion of contracts each. Foreign firms were most successful 
in EU IT services procurement, both in absolute (€3.6 billion) and in relative terms (10% of contracts), 
followed by telecommunication services, computer, medical and precision equipment. 
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markets, including the role of electronic tools. Additional flexibility was also built in, e.g. 
shorter time-periods for procuring goods and services of a type available on the commercial 
market place. Special and differential treatment for developing countries was more clearly 
spelt out, in a manner that, it was hoped, would facilitate their future accessions. Domestic 
review procedures for challenges by suppliers and the rules for modification of the list of 
Parties' coverage were also a point of focus, while it was agreed to develop arbitration 
procedures for resolving differences. In line with the initial GPA mandate, which provides for 
an expansion of coverage and the elimination of discriminatory practices, the EU  adopted a 
very pro-active stance in the negotiations. However, given that not all GPA members shared 
the same level of ambition, the EU had to scale down its ambition and submitted a revised 
offer in 2008. Negotiations are continuing. 
 
Box 7  Emerging market economies and public procurement 
 
 
Lack of data hampers comprehensive analyses of the public procurement markets in the 
emerging world. Estimates for 2007 reveal that public procurement markets in Brazil are 
worth around €133 billion, and around €64 billion in India. Argentina's market is smaller at 
around €15 billion.  If these countries were to open all their "above-threshold" procurement, 
the three markets (taken together) would account for €66 billion worth of public procurement; 
which is comparable to one fifth of the EU procurement market that is offered to GPA 
partners. While relatively small, public procurement markets in emerging countries are 
expected to increase significantly and represent important future business opportunities. EU 
firms may be well positioned to benefit from these markets. 
 
There is some evidence of increasing participation of firms from emerging economies in the 
EU's public procurement markets. For example, Brazilian and Chinese construction 
companies have been active in Portugal and the new Member States while Indian companies 
are participating in public contracts for IT and printing services, as well as electric machinery 
and equipment, particularly in the UK.  
 
 
 
Some progress towards greater openness and transparency in public procurement has also 
been achieved on the bilateral front. Where no multilateral commitments exist, the aim is to 
put in place a legal framework for bilateral market access. Provisions to ensure greater 
openness in public procurement markets were already included in bilateral deals signed with 
Mexico and Chile as well as in the recently concluded negotiations with Iraq, Peru, Colombia, 
and Central America. In the trade agreements currently being negotiated by the EU the 
inclusion of such public procurement provisions is regarded as an important offensive interest 
for the Community. This concerns negotiations with major economies such as India, China, 
Russia, and Mercosur but also smaller countries and regions such as Ukraine, Libya, and 
countries of the Andean Community (Colombia, Ecuador and Peru). With other GPA parties 
the aim of bilateral negotiations is to obtain mutual additional coverage, i.e. beyond what both 
countries have committed to in the GPA context. The recently signed FTA with Korea has 
already successfully included public procurement provisions covering public works 
concessions for example. Currently there are other ongoing bilateral negotiations with GPA 
members (namely Canada and Singapore).  
 
In conclusion, the EU public procurement market is relatively open to foreign suppliers. 
Public entities across the EU generally make their purchasing decisions guided by price and 
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quality considerations regardless of the nationality of the bidders, often going beyond 
commitments made at the multilateral and bilateral level. However, this is an area where trade 
partners have fallen well short of reciprocity, in particular as regards their GPA commitments.  
 
This is partly being addressed through the ongoing GPA negotiations and new bilateral 
agreements while further multilateral negotiations proceed.  Bilateral FTA negotiations often 
allow trade-offs between all sectors and therefore provide more room for manoeuvre for the 
EU to obtain more market access. 
 
However, given that the openness of EU public procurement markets is often taken for 
granted, a more systemic trade instrument may be required in order to secure improved 
symmetry in access to public procurement markets. Such an instrument could respond to 
stakeholders' requests to clarify the conditions of access of third countries operators to the EU 
procurement market while putting additional pressure on trading partners to open up their 
markets. To achieve this goal, access of suppliers from countries that maintain protectionist 
measures could be temporarily restricted in specific EU procurement sectors. Such temporary 
restrictions could only affect the procurement that is not covered by EU international 
commitments (both multilateral and bilateral). Regarding trading partners with whom it has 
not been possible for the  EU to agree on market access commitments so far, there would be 
wide room for manoeuvre. In case of GPA or FTA partners, restrictions could target 
procurement left out of EU commitments, such as that covered by the country-specification 
derogations specified in the EU's general notes to the GPA87. 
 
 
 
                                                 
87 Under GPA 1994, these country-specific derogations concern, for instance, the suppliers and services 
providers from Canada or Japan to EU utilities procurement entities. 
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IV CROSS-CUTTING AREAS  
 
 
1) TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT  
Although the relationship between trade and development is a complex one, there is evidence 
that trade and openness are nevertheless important elements supporting the creation of jobs 
and prosperity in developing countries. Developing countries that have opened their markets 
have often seen high growth rates, and many have found that - when combined with sound 
domestic policies - trade openness can be an important basis for economic growth. On the 
other hand, no developing country has achieved sustained growth by erecting high trade 
barriers and limiting exports.  
 
Open trade policies create opportunities for economic growth. In addition, globalization, trade 
and FDI integration are associated with better, not worse, working conditions. When 
examining the impact of international trade and FDI effects on labour conditions, there is 
convincing evidence that trade and FDI openness play a positive role.88 However, trade 
opening needs to be accompanied by domestic policies to create decent jobs. Countries 
promoting decent work objectives are better placed to benefit from trade opening. The EU 
emphasizes the promotion of social and labour clauses in its bilateral trade agreements and in 
unilateral GSP+ trade preferences.  It relies on cooperation, transparency and dialogue with 
our trade partners. 
 
The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) is the first multilateral trade negotiation launched as 
a development round. Key elements for developing countries in the negotiations are (i) 
enhanced market access (ii) reduction or elimination of subsidies in agriculture and (iii) trade 
facilitation. Trade facilitation in particular is vital for developing countries, since in many 
cases trade costs depend critically on the efficiency and cost of entry and exit of goods in the 
trading country, as well as on the cost of transit of goods via neighbouring countries.  
 
The Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) group of countries are a key tool for promoting sustainable growth and 
development in these countries. The EPAs seek to remove barriers to trade, encourage 
regional integration and boost regional markets, whilst ensuring that the ACP countries have 
sufficient time to make reforms. These are further supported by provisions such as the right to 
regulate to protect the environment or the rights of workers, and by links to enhanced 
development cooperation to support the implementation of the agreement.  
 
Developing countries need assistance in building their capacity to trade (and to cope with the 
inevitable reallocation of resources that follows from trade liberalisation). Aid for Trade is 
financial assistance for developing countries that is specifically targeted at helping them 
develop their capacity to trade, and the EU is the world’s largest provider of Aid for Trade. In 
2007, total Aid for Trade from the EU amounted to €7.2 billion, and specific commitments on 
trade-related assistance reached €2 billion.  
 
One of the centrepieces of the EU's trade and development policies is the EU's GSP scheme. 
It has been in force for nearly 40 years and has been modified on several occasions, most 
                                                 
88 For instance, Newmayer and de Soysa (2005) present evidence that countries that are more open to trade 
and/or have a higher stock of foreign direct investment also have a lower incidence of child labour. See 
Newmayer and de Soysa 'Trade Openness, Foreign Direct Investment and Child Labor', World 
Development, 33 (1), 2005, pp. 43–63. 
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often with respect to product coverage and preferential margins. In June 2008, the EU adopted 
the latest revision of the scheme which runs from 1 January 2009 until the end of 2011. The 
University of Sussex has carried out a comprehensive evaluation of the EU's GSP and found 
that it can be effective in increasing exports and welfare; that utilisation rates are typically 
high; that exporters tend to benefit from preference margins received; and that countries 
seeking GSP+ status are making efforts to ratify the appropriate conventions.89 
 
However, the study also found that the generally low level of EU MFN tariffs and the trade 
structure of many beneficiaries' inevitably limit the effectiveness of the GSP regime. In 
addition, other studies have shown that utilisation rates of preferences tend to decrease with 
lower values of preferential imports.90 Further analysis is therefore needed in order to 
ascertain whether the simplified procedure in place (for consignments of less than €6000) for 
obtaining a certificate of origin needs to be accompanied by a higher threshold and/or if 
measures should be taken by the exporting countries to increase the preference utilisation rate 
for small trade flows.  
 
In view, inter alia, of the progress made under the Doha Round and the negotiations of the 
EPAs with the ACP countries (and with other developing countries such as those in Central 
America or in the Andean Community), the Commission will reflect on future EU trade 
policy vis-à-vis developing countries in a forthcoming Communication on Trade and 
Development. Particular attention will be paid to the autonomous trade instruments, such as 
the GSP, and bilateral/ regional trade policy options that the European Union has at hand and 
the fact that larger emerging economies have different development needs from those of 
small, poor and vulnerable countries.  
 
Global commerce is characterized by large and increasing volumes of trade in intermediate 
products. Producers take advantage of different costs in different locations to source the 
cheapest inputs possible. Allowing producers access to raw materials or intermediate products 
from low cost international sources through relaxed rules of origin (RoO) is therefore vital. 
This will generate economic activity in the beneficiary country and facilitate development. In 
developing countries, where labour is most often abundant and cheap, even simple 
manufacturing operations that provide only low levels of value added can create important job 
opportunities.  
 
For specific situations, e.g. in case of earthquakes, flooding, etc., one could also envisage time 
limited ad-hoc initiative in the area of rules of origin involving the private sector and a 
number of countries. For example, a finished product (associated e.g. with a high tariff on 
exporting markets) produced anywhere in the world using a certain amount of intermediate 
inputs from the crisis-hit country (associated e.g. with a low tariff on exporting markets) 
could become subject to duty free treatment when imported. Tropical fruits contained in 
downstream processed food products are one example. With a high enough tariff on the final 
good, such an incentive may be enough for large private companies to decide to source some 
of the intermediates from the crisis-hit country, and to ensure - for reasons of goodwill and 
corporate social responsibility - that some of the proceeds are channelled back to those in 
need.  
 
                                                 
89 Gasiorek M. et al, 'Mid-term Evaluation of the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences', CARIS, University 
of Sussex, 2005. Available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146196.pdf. 
90 See e.g. Nilsson, L. 'Small trade flows and preference utilization', mimeo, European Commission, DG Trade, 
2009. Available at  http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2009/papers/nilsson.pdf. 
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2) SUSTAINABLE TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE  
 
It is difficult to make general statements about the impact of trade on the environment – e.g. 
in terms of climate change emissions, depletion of natural resources and biodiversity loss.  
Positive and negative effect may occur side by side.  Standard environmental analysis 
methods91 suggest that trade can potentially have several types of impact on the environment.  
Trade as an activity that transfers goods from one country to another can have an impact on 
the environment, the traded products themselves can affect the environment, trade can expand 
economic activity, and trade can change the composition of a production. To illustrate the 
complexity of assessing the environmental footprint of trade in a tractable way, we focus on 
climate change effects in the remainder of this section.  
 
The impact of trade opening on climate change 
CO2 emissions embodied in international trade have been estimated at close to 22% of all 
global CO2 emissions
92. This includes pollution due to production and emissions due to 
international transport.  Emissions due to international transport of goods were estimated to 
account for 4-6% of human-caused greenhouse gas (GHG- emissions in 200093. This figure 
may have increased given the rapid growth of exports relative to world GDP over the last 
decade, unless the technique effect has prevailed.  
There is a widely-held view that, since external trade normally involves transportation of 
goods over longer distances than in the case of domestic trade, any further trade opening 
entails increased GHG emissions. This has contributed to a negative perception of the "carbon 
footprint" of trade opening and traded goods.  However this view is incomplete. Emissions 
from transport are only one component of the emission effects of trade and trade opening. A 
more complete picture should include not only emissions from expanded economic and 
transport activity, but also differences in emissions according to the place of production and 
the production technology, fuel and raw material used. Moreover, the picture can also be 
affected by differences in emission reduction costs between countries and sectors.  The net 
emission balance depends on a combination of three effects:   
– The scale effect or emission increase resulting from an expansion of economic production 
and use of carbon-based energy for production, and a result of a greater use of cross-border 
transport services that also use energy. Globally this effect is emission-increasing. 
– The composition effect arises from changes in a country's production and consumption 
pattern triggered by tariff dismantling and reductions in the trade cost of non-tariff barriers. 
The net emission impact depends on changes in production in low-emission and emission-
intensive sectors. 
– The technique effect refers to improvements in the emission efficiency in production and 
transport. More open trade may increase the availability and lower the costs of climate-
friendly goods and services as more climate-friendly technologies became accessible and 
as external demand for those technologies increases with falling trade barriers.  
                                                 
91 See in particular The Environmental Effects of Trade, Paris, OECD, 1994 
92 Peters, G.P. and Hertwich, E.G. (2008a), “CO2 Embodied in International Trade with Implications for Global 
Climate Policy”, Environmental Science & Technology 42:5, pp. 1401-1407. Hummels D. (2009). How 
Further Trade Liberalisation would Change Greenhouse Gas Emissions from International Freight 
Transport. Paper prepared for OECD Global Forum on Trade and Climate Change. 
93 OECD (2009), Trade, Transport and Climate Change, draft paper of the Joint Working Party in Trade and 
Environment, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: Paris. 
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The scale effect contributes to a negative perception of trade. However, this can be countered 
by emission-reducing composition and technique effects.  Countries with a comparative 
advantage in low-emission industries could benefit from an emission-lowering composition 
effect. However, in a country with a comparative advantage in emission-intensive industries, 
either because of economic factors and/or because of weak environmental regulation, trade 
opening may increase emissions. Such problems could be tackled for instance by linking trade 
opening in the sector concerned to improvements in relevant environmental legislation and 
related enforcement, e.g. through environmental provisions in the trade and sustainable 
development chapter of the bilateral trade agreement negotiated with that country, or by 
means of a robust international environmental agreement.  The technique effect could also 
make a positive contribution and can be strengthened by means of provisions that facilitate 
the transfer of emission-reducing technology, for example by removing the barriers to trade in 
climate friendly goods and technologies.  A joint World Trade Organisation (WTO) - United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) report (2009) summarizes the findings of several 
studies on the effects of trade opening on climate change94.  Some studies conclude that trade 
opening increases CO2 emissions, due to strong scale effects and weak technique effects while 
others suggest that the technique effect dominates the scale and the composition effects only 
for CO2 emissions in OECD countries, but has a detrimental effect on CO2 emissions in non-
OECD countries95.   
The impact of climate change policies on trade 
Trade policies can affect GHG emissions.  By the same token, emission reduction policies can 
also affect trade.  The most obvious example is the binding emission ceilings under the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Kyoto Protocol96.  In the case of a 
trade agreement between two countries that accept and enforce these binding ceilings, the sum 
of the three above-described effects of a trade agreement should be zero in each of the two 
countries. Any increases in emissions caused by increased production and trade, brought 
about by a trade agreement, are compensated for by a reshuffling of available emission rights 
between sectors (composition effect) or changes in production technology (technique effect). 
This excludes the emissions caused by international transport of goods.  As the cost of 
reducing GHG emissions varies from sector to sector, the final outcome of this re-allocation 
of emission rights between sectors is hard to predict.  The sectors that ultimately reap the 
economic benefits from a trade agreement may well be different from those that benefit 
directly from the trade opening provided for in the agreement. Emission constraints and 
tradable emission rights add a new factor of comparative advantage in international trade, 
especially for energy-intensive sectors. 
The implementation of measure to reduce emissions and comply with the emission constraints 
to which countries signed up under the Kyoto Protocol is costly and typically increases 
                                                 
94 WTO-UNEP (2009) "Trade and Climate Change" can be found at http://www.unep.org 
95 Antweiller, W., Copeland, B.R. and Taylor, M.S. (2001) “Is Free Trade Good for the Environment?” 
American Economic Review 91:4, pp. 877-908.  Cole, M.A. and Elliott, R.J.R. (2003), “Determining the 
Trade–Environment Composition Effect: The Role of Capital, Labor and Environmental Regulations”, 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46:3, pp. 363-383.  Managi, S., Hibiki, A. and 
Tsurumi, T. (2008), “Does Trade Liberalization Reduce Pollution Emissions", Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) Discussion Paper Series 08-E-013.  Frankel, J. and Rose, A. (2005), 
“Is Trade Good or Bad for the Environment? Sorting Out the Causality”, Review of Economics and Statistics 
87:1, pp. 85-91.  McCarney, G. and Adamowicz, V. (2005), The Eff ects of Trade Liberalization on the 
Environment: An Empirical Study, selected paper prepared for presentation at the Canadian Agricultural 
Economics Society Annual Meeting 6-8 July, San Francisco, California. 
96 Under the Kyoto Protocol, this refers to the so-called "Annex A" countries which include: all EU member 
states, EFTA countries, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Kyoto expires in 2013.  
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production costs. However, it can be noted in this context that strict emission constraints 
stimulate efficiency and encourage innovation and can therefore also improve 
competitiveness and reduce production cost, in particular in the mid- and long-run.  
As a result of reduction measures, industrial activity in some sectors may relocate in the short 
run to countries that do not impose such stringent emission reduction measures, i.e. mainly 
the countries outside Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol.  When displacement of production 
results in an increase in global emission, this phenomenon is called "carbon leakage".  In the 
EU, the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is the main component of the climate change policy 
package.  The ETS is a cap-and-trade system.  Other possible measures include carbon taxes 
and direct regulation of energy efficiency and emissions by means of technical standards for 
individual goods as well as for entire sectors and industries.  These measures can increase the 
cost of both energy use and emissions, and thereby the cost of production; they may reduce 
profitability and market shares for the targeted goods, sectors and economies, depending on 
market structures.  This opens up two possible channels to move production and emissions 
between countries and thereby create carbon leakage.   
First, producers in countries with weak or no emission reduction measures are not confronted 
by these cost increases and may therefore gain in terms of competitiveness and market share.  
Second, reduced energy demand in countries that restrict emissions will reduce the worldwide 
price of energy and facilitate more energy intensive production. In case of an EU 20% 
reduction target and with other countries implementing their pledges put forward in the 
Copenhagen Accord, carbon leakage is estimated to be less than 1% production loss for most 
of the energy intensive industries in the EU.97  Carbon leakage reduces the effectiveness of 
climate change mitigation measures and allows countries that do not impose such measures to 
free-ride, not only on the long-term climate change mitigation benefits but also on the short-
term trade benefits.  Energy intensive sectors are most at risk because the increases in 
production cost are the highest. However, trade intensity, market structures and competitive 
pressures vary considerably from one industry to another, resulting in differences in abilities 
to pass on the costs to consumers and losses in market shares98.   
The first-best solution to avoid leakage would be a global climate change agreement whereby 
all major economies would agree to take measures to limit their emissions.  Common action 
would considerably reduce leakage as production cost differences would be limited.  In the 
absence of such an agreement and with only a limited number of countries that actively 
implement emission reductions, unilateral action such as the EU ETS may lead to a risk of 
carbon leakage.  However, there are several ways in which leakage can be addressed. 
One possibility is to design a free emission allowance allocation system that reduces the cost 
of production for the most exposed sectors.    This reduces the amount of allowances that the 
sector is required to purchase. Research and experience show that this restores the competitive 
level playing field with producers in countries that are not subject to emission restrictions.   
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme currently allows for the use of international credits, 
thereby lowering the price of compliance for our operators.  However, there are additional 
compatible measures, which would further reduce the risk of carbon leakage.  One possibility 
is to consider applying a more targeted approach to the nature and recognition of international 
credits in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. The clean development mechanism (CDM) 
allows investors to implement emission reduction projects in developing countries not subject 
                                                 
97 Commission Communication: "Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions 
and assessing the risk of carbon leakage" (May 2010) 
98 European Commission Decision 2010/ 2 established a list of sectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk 
of carbon leakage. 
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to Annex I emission ceilings, and sell the related emission reductions on international 
emission certificate markets.  The CDM, however, allows for all of the reduction effort to be 
credited and therefore does not require a reduction contribution from the developing country. 
An EU approach could reinforce efforts to move away from pure offsetting approaches, like 
the CDM, towards sectoral crediting (except for the Least Developed Countries) whereby an 
own contribution is undertaken by developing countries.  Further, the EU could restrict the 
use of CDM credits generated in energy-intensive sectors in third countries other than the 
Least Developed Countries.  These types of actions could help to bring low-carbon measures 
in other countries closer to EU levels, close the competitive gap for energy-intensive 
industries and reduce the risk of carbon leakage in the EU ETS in the corresponding sectors.   
A third possibility that has attracted considerable attention in trade policy circles is the 
introduction of border measures: border taxes or mandatory emission allowance purchases by 
importers, with a possible rebate for exporters.  However, analyses suggest considerable 
difficulties with the practical implementation of such potential measures. Full border 
measures applied to all imports will not be feasible in practice.  They would require detailed 
and worldwide information on the carbon contents of all production processes for all imported 
goods.  Border measures would have to be limited to sectors at risk of carbon leakage.  A 
possible simplification would be to use standard carbon content figures, based on the best 
available technology or on EU benchmarks. However, this would require an option to enable 
producers to submit evidence that their emissions are below this benchmark, which would still 
entail considerable administrative burden and verification of the performance of individual 
installations in third countries.   Furthermore, the potential for substitution of imports between 
less efficient and more efficient producers could undermine its effectiveness. Most 
importantly, the introduction of border measures could arouse considerable controversy in the 
WTO and would not be conducive to concluding the negotiations on a new global climate 
change agreement under the auspices of the UNFCCC.   
Trade policy instruments to mitigate climate change 
Emission reduction is mainly achieved by means of specific climate change related policy 
measures such as carbon taxes, cap-and-trade systems and energy efficiency regulation.  
These policy instruments have an impact on trade.  However, there are also trade policy 
instruments that directly address climate change issues.  Many countries have started to apply 
a wide range of regulatory measures to reduce emissions, for instance through technical 
standards that aim to reduce energy consumption and emissions of a wide range of goods as 
well as production processes.  While these measures may be legitimate means to mitigate 
climate change, regulatory autonomy of countries in this area should be preserved and care 
should be taken to avoid a resurgence of protectionism under the guise of environmental 
policies – often alluded to as "Green Protectionism".  Environmental measures should comply 
with the WTO TBT Agreement.   
One of the ways in which trade policy can actively contribute to mitigating climate change 
and reducing greenhouse gas emissions is by reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade in 
environmental and climate friendly goods and services. This has been actively pursued by the 
EU in the context of the WTO Doha Development Round trade negotiations. Reducing tariffs 
on environmental goods would facilitate trade in goods that embody low-emission 
technologies and spread these technologies more widely and faster in the global economy. 
Tariffs on environmental goods would decrease from 4.4% to 3.6% if the applied tariffs were 
cut to the new bound rates in the December 2008 DDA negotiating proposal. For developing 
countries, tariffs on environmental goods would be cut to 4.3% on average; for developed 
countries they would decrease from 1.3% to 1.1%.  Global trade in environmental goods 
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would increase by € 14 billion; EU exports would increase by € 5.8 billion99.  Some 
developing countries suggested lowering the barriers to access the technological know-how 
and facilitating access to patented climate change related technologies. However, evidence 
shows that patents are not really a bottleneck in the spreading of climate change 
technologies100. On the contrary, strong IPR rules and their implementation are necessary to 
facilitate innovation and private sector investment that will facilitate the spreading of more 
advanced technologies that are needed to achieve climate change objectives more effectively. 
 
 
                                                 
99 Commission services estimates. The results are based on analysis covering the EU plus 22 trading partners, 
accounting for 83% of world imports of environmental goods. The analysis used the WTO’s "friends list" of 
goods, i.e. not necessarily environmentally efficient goods but goods that have a role in addressing 
environmental issues, such as for instance goods used to construct solar panels, 
100 Copenhagen Economics "Are IPR a barrier to the transfer of climate change technology?", January 2009 
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3) ACCESS TO RAW MATERIALS AND GLOBAL WELFARE  
 
In recent years, the issue of ensuring a sustainable supply of raw materials has been placed 
firmly on the EU policy agenda. While the critical role of raw materials for manufacturing is 
not new, the growth in global demand and the upward price pressure driven by the rapid 
industrialisation of emerging economies has triggered renewed concerns with regard to the 
functioning of global markets, see Figure 15. At the same time, the link with the development 
of new technologies has become increasingly evident bringing to light the critical role of 
some raw materials in making the EU into a more innovative and greener economy101. 
 
 
Figure 15  World price index (year 2000 = 100) 
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Source: CPB, World Trade Monitor 
 
 
Most natural raw materials are concentrated in a limited number of countries and often have 
few if any substitutes, given the present state of the technology. This makes most countries 
fundamentally interdependent and bestows a critical role on trade and trade policy. The EU, 
being highly dependent on imports of raw materials, is particularly vulnerable to measures 
                                                 
101 The demand for raw materials has for long been intrinsically linked with technological change. While new 
technologies are developed for reducing the consumption intensity of some natural resources,  the demand for 
certain raw materials can be expected to accelerate with the development of new technologies and new 
industrial goods (such as mobile phones, thin layer photovoltaics, lithium-ion batteries, fibre optic cable, and 
synthetic fuels, among may others), see report to the Commission "Critical Raw Materials for the EU" by ad 
hoc group of the Raw Materials Supply Group available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-
materials/critical/index_en.htm 
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that restrict exports of raw materials, especially those imposed by countries which have a 
monopoly or quasi-monopoly on supply102. However, tackling this kind of trade distortive 
measures is particularly challenging given that their use is not fully ruled out by the current 
WTO disciplines. While quantitative restrictions (notably export quotas and export licences) 
are subject to GATT rules (under GATT Article XI), export taxes are generally not covered 
by multilateral disciplines103.  
 
 
Box 8  Worldwide use of restrictions on raw materials exports 
 
The use of export restrictions applied to raw materials has been growing in recent years with a 
proliferation of measures in various countries. A recent study by the OECD shows that 65 of 
128 WTO members were applying export duties during 2003-2009104. Data collected by the 
Commission105 shows that, as of September 2009, the EU faced over 1200 export 
restrictions.106  The countries imposing the largest number of measures included Argentina 
(888), Ukraine (80), China (40), Russia (39), South Africa (30), Kazakhstan (27) and Algeria 
(25). The most affected sectors were "Agricultural products", "Minerals", "Chemicals", "Raw 
hides and skins", "Leather", "Wood and wood products", and "Metals".  
 
 
 
Academic studies107 confirm the idea that export restrictions are "beggar thy neighbour" 
instruments that reduce global welfare. The use of export restrictions by a country puts 
pressure on other exporters to follow suit unleashing retaliatory policy practices that 
exacerbate the distortions in global markets and push up prices. Export taxes can harm the 
competitiveness of EU industries as they create unfair advantages for firms in downstream 
sectors in the countries imposing the restrictions.  These firms benefit from an "indirect 
subsidy" resulting from privileged access to cheaper inputs.  
 
Moreover, contrary to the common perception, the negative implications associated with the 
use of export restrictions go far beyond the North-South divide. The distortions to the 
                                                 
102 Recently the Commission put forward a list of 14 raw materials that were considered as “critical” (out 
of 41 minerals and metals analysed): antimony, beryllium, cobalt, fluorspar, gallium, germanium, graphite, 
indium, magnesium, niobium, PGMs (Platinum Group Metals), rare earths, tantalum and tungsten. The list 
was established in the framework of the 2008 "EU Raw Materials Initiative", see 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw-materials/critical/index_en.htm. The supply risk is due to the fact 
that a high share of the worldwide production mainly comes from a handful of countries: China (antimony, 
fluorspar, gallium, germanium, graphite, indium, magnesium, rare earths, and tungsten), Russia (PGM), the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt, tantalum) and Brazil (niobium and tantalum). This production 
concentration, in many cases, is compounded by low substitutability and low recycling rates.  
103 Except when provisions were negotiated in WTO accession protocols. 
104 This represented a marked increase relative to the period 1997-2002 when 39 (out of 100) WTO 
Members were using such instruments,  see J. Kim, "Recent trends in export restrictions", OECD Trade Policy 
Working papers, 101, 2010.  
105 The database covers 19 countries including Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, South Africa, Thailand and Ukraine. A measure is defined as a tariff line at HS4 level 
being subject to a quantitative restriction (export quota or export ban), an export tax, or a non-automatic export 
licensing process.  
106 A measure is defined as a tariff line at HS4 level being subject to a quantitative restriction (export quota or     
export ban), an export tax, or a non-automatic export licensing process; see DG Trade  Raw materials 2009 
Annual Report,  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/june/tradoc_146207.pdf 
107 See A. Bouet and D. Laborde, “The economics of export taxation: a theoretical and CGE-approach 
contribution”, 2009, available on http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/3/43965958.pdf 
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functioning international markets of raw materials are also problematic from a development 
point of view. Not only do higher world prices directly harm the developing economies that 
are dependent on international markets for their supply of raw materials but also the countries 
imposing these trade restrictions lose out. Even if gains could be had from an improvement in 
their "terms-of-trade" (for example in the case of a country with a dominant position in the 
global supply of a certain raw material) the reduction of domestic prices would discourage 
further investment in the production/extraction of the raw material.  Moreover, the "implicit 
subsidies" to downstream producers would encourage "excessive" domestic consumption of 
the taxed goods. Thus, in the long run, export restrictions may actually endanger these 
countries' capacity to produce raw materials while failing to ensure the development of a 
sustainable basis for competitiveness in downstream industries.  
 
Against this background, the Commission developed a strategy for trade in raw materials 
(within its overall strategy on raw materials.108 The aim is to tackle restrictions that hamper 
the sustainable supply of raw materials in global markets when they compromise supply to the 
EU and/or distort the level-playing field between downstream EU economic operators and 
operators from third countries. This strategy is based on three main pillars: (i) include relevant 
disciplines in negotiations both at the multilateral and bilateral level, (ii) challenge existing 
restrictions in particular under the dispute settlement measures when they violate WTO or 
bilateral rules, and (iii) reach out to third countries, to convince them that the issue of access 
to raw materials is not just an EU problem and that it is in their own best interest to look into 
the added value of rules.  This strategy is pursued by having the topic aired in bilateral and 
plurilateral discussion settings (OECD).   
                                                 
108 See, "The raw materials initiative - meeting our critical needs for growth and jobs in Europe", COM(2008) 
699. 
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4) SMART TRADE, INNOVATION AND IPR 
 
The acknowledgement that trade is one of the main drivers of economic growth and channels 
of transmission of specialised skills, goes back as far as Adam Smith and David Ricardo. In 
modern times, economists have put knowledge at the centre of economic growth. Knowledge 
transmission has become the key variable in spreading the benefits of economic development 
across the globe. Trade is one of the most important vehicles for knowledge transmission 
around the world: it transfers knowledge embodied in goods, services and investment.  
 
Knowledge can also be transferred in "disembodied" forms, i.e. pure ideas transmitted 
through learning. While ideas are, by their nature, non-rival and non-excludable109, the use of 
some inventions, distinctive signs, works of art, etc. has been made legally exclusive by 
means of intellectual property rights (IPR) such as patents, licences, copyrights, trademarks, 
etc.  IPR create a monopoly on creations which allows rights holders to reap the benefits of 
their investment in producing these creations and prevent free copying/use by third parties.  
IPR strengthen the economic incentive to invest in research and creativity. However, the 
balance between public and private benefits and the extent to which such exclusive rights 
should be granted is a subject of intense debate, especially for creations that contribute to the 
production of important social and public goods.   
 
The link between trade, transfer of innovation and economic growth is by now well-known110. 
Clearly, IPR-covered innovative technologies play a role in this. The knowledge embodied in 
traded goods, as measured by the R&D and patent intensity of goods for instance, and the 
positive impact of this trade on innovation and economic growth in the importing and 
exporting countries, has been empirically demonstrated111. Similar innovation transfer 
mechanisms have been demonstrated in foreign direct investment flows. Patents are an 
important vehicle in these international technology transfers. It has been shown that the legal 
use of patents, as documented by patent citations112 for instance, has been shown to play an 
important role in trade and technology transfers between developed countries and emerging 
market economies113. Emerging market economies benefit more easily from foreign 
knowledge transfers once they have reached a certain level of technical absorption capacity.  
For low-income countries at a lower level of technological development, these benefits are 
more difficult to achieve, although IPR systems may help them leverage local creations such 
as music and literature 
 
How do these concepts translate into the reality of EU trade flows? 
 
                                                 
109 Non-rival means that ideas can be used by many persons at the same time, without any reduction in user 
benefits for all these users.  A physical good can normally be used by one or a few persons at the time; adding 
more users quickly leads to diminishing benefits.  Non-excludable means that other persons can not be excluded 
from using these ideas once they are known. Property rights impose legal restrictions and exclusive use rights. 
110 G. Grossman & E. Helpman (1991) " Trade, Knowledge Spillovers, and Growth", NBER Working Paper No. 
w3485.  Stephen Redding & James Proudman, 1998. "Productivity convergence and international openness," 
Bank of England working papers 77. 
111  D. Coe and E. Helpman (1995) "International R&D Spillovers", NBER Working Paper No. W4444.  Bruno 
Van Pottelsberghe De La Potterie & Frank Lichtenberg, 2001. "Does Foreign Direct Investment Transfer 
Technology Across Borders?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(3), pages 490-497, 
August. 
112 Patent citations refer to earlier patents cited in newly registered patents. 
113  Bascavusoglu (2005) " Does International Trade Transfer Technology to Emerging Countries? A Patent 
Citation Analysis", UK Open University Research Center, working paper nr 14. 
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Despite the economic crisis, the EU has shown remarkable resilience in its capacity to export 
relatively expensive and technology-intensive goods114. The EU has performed well in up-
market products, where it is maintaining its market share even when other developed country 
partners are losing ground (see section II.1). In other words the EU has managed to continue 
to command relatively high prices for its products compared to those prevailing on the world 
market. EU companies continue to supply a large share of the world market in high tech and 
medium tech products. In spite of their well documented weaknesses, especially in 
information technologies, they have shown resilience in high-tech sectors, in contrast to 
companies from the US and Japan which have lost significant market share. China has clearly 
made major inroads into these markets.  
 
Table 14:  Decomposition of factors that affect changes in world market shares, for 
high-tech and up-market products (1994-2007) 
 
  Contributions to changes in market share : 
 
Market share 
% ∆ Performance Structural effects 
   
Geographic 
composition 
Sector 
composition 
Technological products 
EU25 6.7 -14.7 0.8 20.5 
EU15 0.5 -20.9 0.1 21.3 
NMS10 165.7 149.2 10.4 6.1 
USA -60.4 -74.8 6.6 7.8 
Japan -96.4 -99.7 5.3 -2.0 
China 185.9 220.0 -14.5 -19.6 
India 119.6 80.6 4.7 34.3 
Russia 54.9 13.5 39 2.4 
Brazil 102.1 108 -21.3 15.4 
Up-market products 
EU25 1.6 -1.5 -4.7 7.8 
EU15 -2.2 -5.0 -5.3 8.1 
NMS10 168.1 160.3 10.7 -2.9 
USA -38.8 -43.5 4.0 0.7 
Japan -42.8 -58.9 9.8 6.3 
China 171.1 226.7 -14.5 -41.1 
India 121.4 142.9 -3.3 -18.3 
Russia 31.6 -19 24 26.6 
Brazil -3.0 24.9 -13 -14.8 
Source: CEPII (2010).  See footnote 5 for the full reference. 
 
Table 14 presents a more complete picture of the performance of the EU and its major trading 
partners in high-tech and high-priced (up-market) products over the period 1994-2007.  The 
first column shows the percentage change in market shares over that period for high-tech and 
high-priced goods.  Clearly, emerging market economies have substantially increased their 
                                                 
114 A. Cheptea, L. Fontagné and S. Zignago (2010) "European export performance", CEPII working document nr 
2010-12, available at www.cepii.fr.  
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market share, although starting from low figures in 1994.  But while the US and Japan have 
lost a significant part of their export market, the EU has held steady.  The next three columns 
decompose that change in export market share into three factors: changes in the growth rate of 
the sector and the growth rate of the (geographical) destination market – two factors largely 
outside the control of the exporter – and changes in own "performance", a factor controlled by 
the exporter.  The EU's performance measure has clearly weakened in high-tech products and 
to a lesser extent in high-priced up-market products, but far less so than for the US and Japan. 
However, the latter two have better focused their exports on growing sectors and destination 
markets.  China has very much improved its performance indicator, probably starting from a 
very low basis in 1994, but its handicapped by poor geographic focus and sectoral structure. 
India, Russia and Brazil show a mixed performance on these indicators. 
 
Sustained performance in global markets and external competitiveness are driven to a large 
extent by R&D activities. Trade is an important means to facilitate "smart growth" and access 
to R&D. Dissemination of technology can occur through a variety of trade channels 
including: imports of high-tech products, foreign direct investments by multinational 
corporations and acquisition of human capital.  
 
An open EU trade policy supports these transmission mechanisms and allows EU firms to 
access new markets and expand the scale of their production, thus reducing the cost of R&D 
and increasing the returns to innovation. Both exports and imports can play an important role 
in promoting technological and innovation spill-overs for EU companies. It is usually argued 
that the rapid increase in exports of primarily low-tech manufactured goods from emerging 
markets, particularly in Asia has eroded the comparative advantage and the industrial base in 
developed countries. However, an often neglected effect is the indirect effect of increased 
imports (both of intermediate and finished products) on the ability of EU producers to export 
and move up the technological ladder. For instance, using a panel of over 200,000 European 
firms, researchers demonstrated that import competition led to both within-firm technology 
upgrading and between-firm reallocation of employment towards more technologically 
advanced firms or subsidiaries. These effects account for about 15-20% of technology 
upgrading between 2000 and 2007. These results suggest that trade with low wage countries 
appear to have potentially large beneficial impacts on technical change, as recent theories 
suggest115. 
 
Certainly, EU production of, and specialisation in, high-tech and R&D intensive trade could 
be improved. Open trade, as a vehicle for technology transfers, can contribute to this. 
However, the current EU export structure already embodies considerable know-how and 
technology.  Another issue then is the extent to which the IPR on embodied innovative 
technologies yield dividends for EU innovators.  Much of these dividends are of course 
reaped through higher prices that innovative goods fetch on world markets.  Another stream 
of dividends, for disembodied knowledge, comes in through royalties and license fees.  In 
2009, the EU received about € 25 bln in royalties and licences fees, of which  € 9 bln from the 
US and nearly € 1.7 bln each from Japan and China.  In that same year, it paid about € 39 bln 
in royalties and fees, including € 21 bln to the US, € 4 bln to Switzerland and € 2 bln to 
Japan116. 
 
                                                 
115 Nicholas Bloom , Mirko Draca, John Van Reenen (2009): "Trade induced technical change? The impact of 
Chinese imports on innovation, diffusion and productivity", Stanford university working paper. 
116 Source: Eurostat 
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A related question is the degree of protection that EU export markets offer in respect of both 
knowledge embodied in traded goods and disembodied knowledge. Table 15 below presents 
IPR protection scores for the EU and its main trading partners117.  This highlights the risks 
that EU IPR holders run when they export IPR-intensive goods, carry out FDI transactions in 
IPR-intensive sectors or licence their IPR rights to agents in these countries.  Conversely, it is 
also an indicator of risk of IPR violations when the EU imports goods from these countries.  
 
Table 15  IPR protection scores for the EU and trading partners 
 
 
 
The average EU score of 7.7 hides wide variations among member states (between 4.4 and 
8.5). IPR legislation in the EU is a Member States competence in a number of areas, and is 
harmonised at EU level in other areas.  The wide variation illustrates the need to move 
forward in the completion of an internal market for intellectual property rights, including an 
EU patent, not only as a way to improve the EU's overall score but also to reinforce credibility 
vis à vis its trade partners.   
 
The best scores are found among the EU's most developed trading partners, EFTA, US, Japan 
and Korea.  Other trading partners' scores are considerably below those of the EU.  The EU's 
closest neighbours are actually at the bottom of the ranking, indicating that the EU also needs 
to improve IPR protection in its own vicinity. 
 
 
Figure 16  Country of provenance
119
 of detained goods imported into the EU 
                                                 
117 IPRI scores are taken from the International Property Rights Index 2010 and range from 0 (no protection) to 
10 (perfect protection).  The scores are based on three survey-based measures:  the intellectual property 
protection survey results (WEF Global Competitiveness Index 2009), the Ginarte-Park Index of patent rights 
protection (2005) and the Intellectual Property Alliance 2009 indicator of effective enforcement of 
copyrights. 
118 International Property Rights Index 2010, available at http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/ 
119 The country of provenance of a shipment is not necessarily the same as the country of origin of the goods. 
Country IPR score 
  
EU27 7,7 
EFTA 8,2 
US 8,5 
Japan 8,3 
Korea 7,0 
ASEAN 5,7 
GCC 5,4 
India 5,3 
Mercosur 4,9 
China 4,8 
Russia 4,6 
Candidates / Balkans 4,5 
Neighbourhood 3,6 
  
Source:  IPRI 2010 Report
118
     Note: trade-weighted averages 
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Cyprus  4,1%
Egypt  4,5%
UAE  14,6%
India  2,3%
Other  5,7%
Turkey  1,1%
Hong Kong  1,4%
Taiwan  1,9%
China  64,4%
China  64,4%
UAE  14,6%
Egypt  4,5%
Cyprus  4,1%
India  2,3%
Taiw an  1,9%
Hong Kong  1,4%
Turkey  1,1%
Other  5,7%
 
Source: European Commission "Report on EU customs enforcement of intellectual property rights. Results at the 
EU border – 2009".  Full report available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/customs/customs_controls/counterfeit_piracy/statistic
s/statistics_2009.pdf 
 
 
 
Figure 17  Types of IP rights related to the detained goods 
 
90,05%
4,99%
3,57% 1,32%
Trademark
Patent
Copyright / related right
Design and model right
 
 
 
Source: idem figure 16. 
 
According to the IPRI report, the IPR scores are positively correlated with GDP:  developed 
countries have stronger incentives to enforce IPR than developing countries120.  This may 
partly explain the conflicting interests between developed and developing countries on IPR 
issues in international trade negotiations, including in the TRIPS Council.  On the other hand, 
the IPR score is not correlated with overall FDI flows (IPRI 2010, p 45), though more detailed 
                                                 
120 IPRI 2010 Report, page 43, available at http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/ 
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research has demonstrated correlations with FDI flows in IPR-intensive industries121.  Rapid 
growth of the emerging market economies will gradually bring them closer to EU interests in 
their IPR policies, including in enforcement.  The economic history of several East Asian 
countries (Taiwan, Korea, and Japan) over the last couple of decades illustrates that argument.   
 
Weak IPR scores are not only a risk for EU exports they also represent a risk of IPR 
violations in EU imports from these countries.  That is illustrated in Figure 16 which gives a 
picture of the provenance 122of goods detained by EU Customs and suspected to infringe IPR 
at the EU border.  China remains by far the most important provenance of goods suspected of 
infringing an IP right.  It accounts for almost two thirds of all detained goods. Figure 17 
shows that trademark violations account for over 90% of counterfeited goods seized by 
customs.  The graph does not include statistics on copyrights violations in digital media that 
are traded over the internet.  The patent violations recorded in Figure 17 may only be the top 
of the iceberg of this type of IPR infringement; most of them are invisibly embodied in goods.   
 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) also have a potential role to play with respect to 
European innovation and competitiveness. In 2006, SMEs accounted for 99.8% of all EU 
enterprises, 67% of employment and 58% of value added. Moreover, between 2004 and 2006 
the number of employees, value added and labour productivity all grew faster in SMEs than in 
large firms.123 
 
Whereas SMEs do not innovate as much, on average, as large firms, there is a clear link 
between internationalisation and innovation among SMEs. 26% of internationally active 
European SMEs introduced products or services that were new for their sector in their 
country, compared to only 8% for other SMEs.124 One quarter of EU SMEs export or have 
exported within the last 3 years, and 29% have imported. The majority of this trade is with 
other EU Member States, with 14% of European SMEs importing from markets outside the 
EU and 13% exporting to countries outside the EU.  
  
Being an importer seems to open doors to exporting. Twice as many SMEs that are engaged 
in both importing and exporting started by importing.125 SMEs become more competitive by 
importing due to cheaper inputs and acquiring knowledge, but also due to the fact that 
enterprises learn how to engage in international trade. Participation in global value chains 
contributes positively to the efficiency and innovative potential of SMEs.126 This is 
particularly true in knowledge-intensive sectors, where cutting-edge suppliers are often not 
available locally and strategic alliances are crucial both to launching new products and to 
exploring new markets. However, SMEs often lack information not only about opportunities, 
but also about the necessary steps and procedures to enter into a formal agreement with a 
foreign partner. Furthermore, it is important that public support programmes should focus on 
imports as well as on exports. 
 
 
                                                 
121 Branstetter et.al. (2004) "Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Increase International Technology 
Transfer? Empirical Evidence from U.S. Firm-Level Panel Data", World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 3305. 
122 The country of provenance is the country from which the goods are shipped to the EU whereas the country of 
origin is in principle the country where the goods are produced 
123 Eurostat, Statistics in Focus 71, 2009. Numbers are excl. financial business 
124 European Commission, DG Enterprise, Internationalisation of European SMEs, 2010. 
125 This covers 33 European countries (EU27, Croatia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, FYROM, Norway and Turkey) 
and covers both intra- and extra-EU trade. 
126 OECD (2010) "SMEs, Entrepreneurship and Innovation" and OECD (2008) "Enhancing the Role of SMEs in 
Global Value Chains", Paris. 
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Trade policy instruments to improve EU performance in innovative sectors 
 
While the stimulation of innovation and R&D is clearly a domestic policy issue, the 
facilitation of trade and investment in innovative products, and the protection of these 
innovations in an international trade context, is within the remit of trade policy.  As part of the 
EU2020 policy platform, the "Innovation Union" flagship policy is the main supporting policy 
instrument for generating more innovation and comparative advantage in R&D intensive 
goods.  This includes the goal of establishing a unitary EU-wide patent.  A single EU patent, 
including a Unified Patent Litigation System, would strengthen the EU's position as a 
patenting area in the global economy. 
 
The most important innovation policy instrument from a trade perspective is the protection of 
IPR.  At multilateral level, basic IPR rights and standards to which WTO member have to 
adhere are defined in the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Agreement. Moreover, a series of international agreements and conventions lay down specific 
standards for IPR protection.  Bilateral trade agreements can include more specific provisions, 
as is the case with most EU FTAs, including encouraging the partner country to sign up to 
international IPR conventions and standards.   
 
In the case of access to medicines, the TRIPS Agreement provides for "flexibilities" in order 
to strike a more acceptable balance between the social importance of affordable access to 
medicines, the rights of IPR holders and the corresponding incentives for further research that 
those rights create.  Some developing countries have tried to launch a similar debate on IPR in 
climate change technologies.  Here, the Commission has shown that there is no need to relax 
these IPR as they do not constitute a bottleneck in the spread of these technologies127. 
 
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is a proposed plurilateral agreement  
establishing international standards on intellectual property rights enforcement. ACTA seek to 
establish a new international legal framework that countries can join on a voluntary basis.  
ACTA negotiations are on-going between the EU, US, Japan, Switzerland, Australia, New 
Zealand, Mexico, Morroco, Singapore, Canada and Korea.  Besides this legal framework, an 
operational Strategy for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in third Countries128 
was put in place in 2004 to reduce significantly the level of IPR violations in third countries 
by means of enhanced cooperation with rights holders and raising awareness in target 
countries. This Strategy is now under evaluation and will be revised in function of the 
evaluation findings and of the results of an on-going survey on enforcement practices by 
trading partners.  
 
The EU has also used trade policy instruments to favour trade in products that embody 
specific advanced technologies.  The EU is a member of the International Technology 
Agreement (ITA), a plurilateral agreement that eliminates tariffs on trade in ICT products.  
The ITA has contributed to a very substantial growth in trade in ICT products.  The 
competitiveness of EU trade in ICT products is demonstrated by significant price differences 
between EU exports and other ITA member country exports of these products, which provide 
an indication of the superior quality of EU ICT products.   
 
IPR protection is important not just for "new" products but also for traditional products. 
Geographical Indications (GIs) are intellectual property rights that confer a right to use a 
distinctive sign to identify a product that comes from a specific region and has a given quality 
                                                 
127 Copenhagen Economics (2009) "Are IPR a barrier to access to climate change technologies? ", study for the 
European Commission (DG TRADE) available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/analysis/chief-economist/. 
128  See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/c_129/c_12920050526en00030016.pdf 
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essentially attributable to its geographical origin.  GIs convey region-specific quality 
characteristics and production methods that are valued by consumers, while allowing 
continuous investment in innovation and quality improvements.129  This specific quality is 
usually reflected in significant price premia for GI producers.130  Products benefiting from GIs 
are traded worldwide, such as wines and spirits, which dominate the total value of EU GIs 
exports but available trade statistics on GIs are limited. For many GIs, especially those 
produced by SMEs, the domestic market still accounts for a large share of sales.  The main 
EU GI exports are wines and spirits. Diary products make up a smaller share.  Over the last 
decade exports of GI cheeses have recorded strong growth rates but nevertheless below the 
growth rate of total EU exports. However, these GI exports figures may be underestimates, 
given the large number of protected GIs that are not captured by the current trade statistics. 
Enhanced GI protection is not the only factor influencing export performance. Some countries 
offer other forms of protection of GIs, for instance through trade marks. The success of GI 
products depends crucially on consumer choices and resources devoted to marketing, 
advertising and branding. Much also depends on local market demand, the availability of 
(legal or counterfeit) substitute products, and the structure of trade barriers. In some markets, 
EU GI exports are also hampered by high traditional trade barriers, as well as GI 
infringements.131   
 
Another area where the EU favours positive discrimination of innovative products is in 
environmental goods and services.  The elimination of tariffs on environmental goods is part 
of the DDA negotiations.  Trade policy may occasionally be used to discriminate against 
some technologies, when they are perceived as national security risks – for example export 
controls on dual use goods.  Domestic regulation has an important role to play in the 
promotion and discrimination of technologies – for example regulation that limits the use of 
GMO products in the food chain.  In new and rapidly changing technology areas, such as 
energy efficiency standards, green technologies, nano technology products, etc., the early 
adoption of appropriate regulation may facilitate its introduction on domestic and global 
markets.    
 
                                                 
129 Felix Addor and Alexandra Grazioli, "Geographical Indications beyond Wines and Spirits: A Roadmap for a 
Better Protection for Geographical Indications in the WTO TRIPS Agreement", Journal of World 
Intellectual Property, vol.5, no 6., November 2002, Geneva, pp. 865-897. 
130 The price premium granted by the "Champagne" GI, for instance, is considerable: despite large variations in 
the price of champagne across countries, the world average unit price of Champagne could several times 
higher than for sparkling wines. 
131 For instance, in 2008 EU wines face tariffs over 20% in more than 40 trading partners. 
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5) RULES ON COMPETITION AND SUBSIDIES 
Rules on competition and subsidies form part of the regulatory framework of the markets in 
which EU businesses operate. Absent or ineffective competition and state aid rules in third 
countries can limit market access for EU exporters as they raise new barriers with the same 
effects as conventional tariff or non-tariff barriers. The EU therefore has a strategic interest in 
developing international rules and cooperation on competition policy to ensure that European 
firms do not suffer in third countries from distortive subsidisation of local companies or anti-
competitive practices.  
At the same time, effective rules on competition and subsidies are also in the interest of the 
EU's partners as they enhance economic welfare and growth. Ineffective competition not only 
harms consumers and purchasers of intermediate products, but in the long-run, it also 
undermines domestic industry's ability to compete with more nimble foreign rivals. Likewise, 
trade-distortive subsidies divert resources from other stakeholders and thus diminish their 
competitiveness. There is thus a clear mutual interest for trading partners to agree on binding 
rules in this area. Independently of trade negotiations, an increasing number of emerging 
economies (including China) have adopted competition laws in recent years. 
A multilateral set of rules adopted in the WTO framework would clearly be the first-best 
outcome as many competition and subsidy rules are by their nature non-discriminatory and 
thus raise free-rider problems. Although the WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM) prohibits certain types of subsidies, the low number of 
cases (compared to antidumping cases) suggests that its scope and the applicable burden of 
proof are relatively restrictive.  
Meanwhile, many key issues can also be addressed through FTAs. The Global Europe 
Communication therefore called for stronger provisions for competition in FTAs.  
Following Global Europe, the Commission has consistently included chapters on competition 
policy and subsidies in its FTA negotiations. On competition policy, it was agreed in the 
FTAs with Korea, Central America, Colombia and Peru (and to some extent the Cariforum 
EPA) to maintain effective competition laws and an appropriately equipped competition 
authority responsible for addressing anti-competitive practices, such as cartels, abusive 
behaviour by companies with a dominant market position and mergers. The FTA partners 
have recognised the importance of respecting the principles of due process in applying these 
competition laws. Furthermore, provisions laying down the main principles for consultation 
and cooperation were agreed.  
In the subsidies field, the level of ambition has varied more significantly between individual 
negotiations, ranging from enhanced transparency to (in the FTAs with Korea, Colombia, 
Peru, Central America) to substantive rules (in the case of Korea). Possible explanations for 
the more difficult negotiating environment in the subsidies field include trading partners' 
domestic policy context (lobbying power of subsidy recipients) as well as free rider issues (-it 
may be particularly effective to grant subsidies if trading partners refrain from doing so).  
Hence, while some important aspects of competition and subsidy rules have been addressed 
by the EU's bilateral FTA negotiations, a multilateral (or plurilateral) approach would hold 
advantages especially in areas where rules are by definition non-discriminatory.  
